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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
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In the rst chapter of my dissertation, Aleksandr Yankelevich and I examine the eects
of price matching guarantees on duopoly markets. We nd that a commitment to pricematch raises prices by altering consumer search behavior in three ways. First, price-matching
diminishes rms' incentives to lower prices to attract consumers who have no search costs.
Second, for consumers with positive search costs, price-matching lowers the marginal benet of search, inducing them to accept higher prices. Finally, price-matching can lead to
asymmetric equilibria where one rm runs fewer sales and both rms tend to oer smaller
discounts than in a symmetric equilibrium. These price increases grow with the proportion
of consumers who invoke price-matching guarantees and also in the level of equilibrium
asymmetry.
The second chapter studies the eect of the complexity of consumers' preferences over a
product on that product's market structure. I relate complexity of preferences to the number of dimensions of a Lancasterian characteristic space. Using a novel higher dimensional
Hotelling model, I nd that a xed number of rms are likely to be better o competing
over products with more complex preferences. Although rms face more intense competition in higher dimensional markets, the greater product dierentiation aorded to them
allows them to charge higher prices and earn higher prots. This result provides a clear

vii

theoretical foundation for the observation that goods associated with more complex preferences typically display a greater variety of products sold. Additionally, I show that the
behavior of more than two rms competing in more than one dimension diers wildly from
that of rms typically studied in models of spatial competition.
The nal chapter will examine rms' motives for implementing grandfather clauses that
allow certain consumers to continue to access a service at a favorable, but no longer available price. Grandfather clauses permit rms to price discriminate between early adopters
and new consumers in exchange for forfeiting the right to optimally set prices for early
adopters. They may be used to thwart competition following a structural change, to respond to cost shocks, or to retain customers who consume another good from a multiproduct rm. We analyze under what conditions rms might choose to oer grandfather
clauses and what eects they have on welfare.

viii

Chapter 1

Introduction

In my dissertation I seek to extend our knowledge of the ways that rms compete with one
another in the marketplace. Particularly, I explore a variety of practices other than simply altering the price or quality of their product that rms use to gain an edge over their
competition. In much of the economics literature it is supposed that rms can only gain
long term advantage by selling either a superior product or a product they can produce at
reduced cost. However, in equilibrium we observe that rms use a huge variety of special
promotions, limited time oers, and other sorts of manipulation to gain advantage. Due to
their persistence in equilibrium, it must be supposed that many of these marketing practices do confer advantages. My work seeks to understand the channels through which these
advantages may be gained and whether or not the practices should be considered potentially harmful.
Each chapter of my dissertation focuses on a dierent strategy employed by rms. The
second studies price matching guarantees, the third studies multi-axis product dierentiation, and the last studies the use of grandfather clauses. The work is theoretical, and
as such is mostly concerned with developing conceptual frameworks in which these phenomenon can be studied. Accordingly almost all of the techniques employed can be found

1

in calculus or real analysis. More information on these works' relation to the literature,
scope, and results can be found in the introductory section of each of the chapters.
The second chapter of my dissertation is coauthored with Aleksandr Yankelevich. While
he contributed the majority of the work concerning the construction of the model and the
proof of the main results, I contributed a thorough simulation of the environment over a
restricted parameter space which is used extensively to explain the environment to the
reader as well as forming the meat of section 2.6. Additionally, I helped motivate the model
by referencing the concept of "deal-prone" consumers. Finally, I did signicant work in the
writing and editing of the paper.

2

Chapter 2

Price-Matching Guarantees

2.1 Introduction
Price-matching guarantees can be found in a variety of markets, including consumer electronics, oce supplies, clothing, groceries and hotels. These guarantees typically come in
the form of an oer by a rm to lower its price to that of a cheaper rival selling an identical good for consumers who can oer proof of the rival's price. Firms inform consumers
about their price-matching guarantees in television advertisements, using print ads, and
over the Internet. For instance, in one commercial, Walmart tells viewers that it will match
rival prices eighteen times within the span of thirty seconds to remind consumers that its
every day low prices are Backed by [its] Ad Match Guarantee.

1

In a holiday ad, Toys R

Us asks viewers why they would shop anywhere else for toys when the highest concentration of the hottest toys is at Toys R Us, all with price-match guarantee.

2

Because of

such marketing eorts, consumers who engage in repeated interactions with price-matching

1 See Walmart Match It Commercial.

youtube.com. May 07, 2011. Retrieved February 28, 2015.

hhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIXOU7DQdS8i.

2 See Toys R UsHoliday 2012 Commercial`Toy Tracker Price Match'.

2012. Retrieved February 28, 2015.

hhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwp&v=3mQ0xmzeSfI&NR=1i.

3

youtube.com. November 04,

brands, come to expect these guarantees. The expectation of a price-matching guarantee
should inuence the way a consumer shops, which in turn aects rm pricing. It is already
well known that when consumers have additional information about rms, their shopping
3

behavior can change.

Yet, in spite of the wealth of economics and marketing literature

studying price-matching guarantees, the exploration of their eect on consumers' shopping
incentives remains limited.
Economists initially viewed price-matching guarantees as being anti-competitive. This idea
was rst raised by Hay (1982) and then Salop (1986), who suggest that these guarantees
allow rms to immediately retaliate against rival price cuts without actually listing lower
prices or expending resources to learn about competitor prices. This can lead to tacit collusion in a non-cooperative equilibrium by removing rms' incentives to cut prices. Subsequently, this view was formalized in multiple settings: Bertrand oligopoly (Doyle 1988),
dierentiated products Stackelberg duopoly (Belton 1987), Hotelling duopoly (Zhang 1995),
and dierentiated products Bertrand duopoly where consumers incur hassle costs of apply4

ing price-matching guarantees (Hviid and Shaer 1999).

Such models leave no room for

consumers to make shopping decisions. Tacit collusion occurs because rms respond to
each other, not to their customers.
An alternate line of reasoning posits that price-matching guarantees allow rms to price
discriminate between consumers with limited price information and those who are informed
about multiple price quotes. For example, Png and Hirshleifer (1987) show that pricematching guarantees allow rms to keep list prices high to extract welfare from uninformed
consumers, while attracting informed consumers by oering to price-match the rival rm
when it oers a lower price. Models with heterogeneous consumers have also been used to

3 See for instance, Robert and Stahl (1993) and Janssen and Non (2008).
4 More recently, Hviid and Shaer (2010) have shown that price-matching guarantees can complement
the price-increasing eect of a most-favored-customer clause when both are oered unilaterally by a single
rm.

4

suggest that price-matching guarantees can lead to pro-competitive eects. For instance,
Corts (1996) and Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001) show that when rms use pricematching guarantees to price discriminate, some or all consumers may end up paying lower
prices and consumer welfare can increase. Using surveys of potential consumers, Jain and
Srivastava (2000) and Srivastava and Lurie (2001) argue that consumers perceive stores
that oer price-matching guarantees to have lower prices. Moorthy and Winter (2006)
and Moorthy and Zhang (2006) build on this argument by constructing models of pricematching with respectively, horizontal and vertical rm dierentiation, where consumers
consider their location or service preferences when choosing where to purchase and consumers who are uninformed about prices use price-matching as a signal that inuences
their price expectation for a particular rm. They show that when the dierence in production costs between the two rms is suciently large and the uninformed population
is suciently small, price-matching guarantees can be used to signal a low price and consumer welfare improves for a range of parameters.
While each of the aforementioned models has shown that price-matching can alter rm
pricing behavior, as Moorthy and Winter point out, and as we explore in detail in this article, another allocative eect of price-matching is its impact on consumers' incentive to
invest in information about prices (i.e., to price shop). Price-matching models of tacit collusion preclude this eect by assuming that all consumers are perfectly informed about
rm pricing decisions. Consequently, in these models, either price-matching leads to a
symmetric monopolistic outcome, or in order to avoid the monopoly result, the authors
assume that products are somehow dierentiated. However, rms generally will not honor
price-match guarantees on products that are not identical.

5

Price-matching models based

5 An alternative interpretation casts product dierentiation in terms of dierences in rm location. But
this interpretation is at odds with the idea of perfect price information unless all consumers can travel
freely from store to store. Although this is conceivable in an on-line retail environment, price-matching
guarantees often stipulate that on-line prices will not be matched.

5

on price discrimination assume that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the amount
of price information that they possess. However, dierences in price information are exogenously imposed and consumers may be assumed to act in a way that is in contrast to what
they would do were they allowed to engage in optimal shopping behavior.
We depart from the earlier literature by endogenizing the incentive to acquire price information and allowing consumers to engage in optimal price search using a duopoly version
of Stahl's 1989 model of sequential consumer search in which rms rst have an option
to oer a price-matching guarantee before setting prices for a homogeneous good. There
are two types of consumers in the market: those who face no opportunity cost of searching (referred to as shoppers) and those who do (non-shoppers). In Stahl-type models, it
is well established that consumers follow a reservation price rulecontinue searching only
if the last price observed is greater than an endogenously determined reservation price
while rms randomize over lower prices to attract shoppers and over higher prices to realize greater prots from non-shoppers.
In this framework, we nd that price-matching guarantees bring about a number of priceincreasing changes in consumer search behavior. First, because shoppers freely observe
every price, in Stahl's original model, the rm with the lowest listed price captures all of
them. However, when consumers know that rms price-match, some shoppers can use a
price-matching guarantee to obtain the lowest price at a rm listing a higher price. This
option diminishes rms' incentive to lower prices because the lowest listed price no longer
guarantees a rm will capture all shoppers. Recognizing this price-increasing eect, nonshoppers anticipate higher prices in rms they have not sampled. Hence, a second priceincreasing eect arises from non-shoppers' willingness to pay a higher maximal price at
the rm where they begin their search rather than pay the search cost to sample another
rm's price.
As in Stahl's model, in equilibrium only shoppers sample the prices of both rms. Conse-

6

quently, consumers who use price-matching guarantees (the shoppers) never expect them
to yield a lower price. This stands in particular contrast to the Chen, Narasimhan, and
Zhang (2001) model of consumer heterogeneity and competitive price-matching guarantees, where price-matching alters prices via information gains on the part of previously
uninformed consumers, who may use the guarantees to secure lower prices. The fact that
optimal searchers cannot realize such gains in our model seems to us rather sensible: pricematching can be a time consuming activity which only price conscious consumers with a
lower opportunity cost of using their time should be expected to engage in. Moreover, because search is endogenous in our model, price-matching guarantees not only have the potential to diminish rm incentives to lower prices, but also to inhibit search activity in a
way that raises prices even further.
In a recent article, Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013) also found that price-matching guarantees raise prices through their eects on consumer search. However, there are a number of important dierences between this article and Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013), the
foremost of which is that whereas we analyze a setting where price-matching policies are
advertised by rms and invoked by consumers prior to purchase, Janssen and Parakhonyak explore the impact of posterior price-matching in which some consumers can get a
discounted price if after having purchased from a rm that turns out to oer a price-match
guarantee, these consumers acquire additional price information (e.g., from friends) that a
dierent rm oers a lower price.
Unlike in our model (or that of Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang 2001), Janssen and Parakhonyak cannot analyze how rms such as Walmart or Best Buy, with a reputation for pricematching, inuence consumer behavior. Because in the model of Janssen and Parakhonyak, consumers do not learn whether or not a rm oers to price-match until they have
sampled its price, price-matching guarantees do not aect search order. Moreover, Janssen
and Parakhonyak suppose that price sensitive shoppers, whom we believe are natural can-

7

didates to invoke price-matching guarantees, never use these guarantees. Instead, as in
Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001), price-changes in Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013)
occur when

uninformed

consumers react to information gains that crop up because of

price-matching guaranteesthough unlike in Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001), consumers are punished with this additional information.
We nd that the more

informed

consumers (shoppers) invoke price-matching guarantees,

the more powerful the price-increasing eects of price-matching. In particular, we study
what happens when a proportion of shoppers chooses not to invoke guarantees, possibly
as a result of hassle costs of doing so. As this proportion decreases in number, average
prices increase, and if both rms oer price-matching guarantees, prices can reach the
monopoly level in the limit where all shoppers invoke the guarantees. This result lends
theoretical support to the empirical nding by Dugar and Sorensen (2006), that the market price varies inversely with the number of positive hassle cost buyers. Thus, as Dugar
and Sorensen point out, rms that advertise price-match guarantees, but at the same time
make them dicult to invoke, may be using them primarily to price discriminate among
consumers rather than to achieve tacit collusion. Conversely, a regulator observing a trend
in ease of use of price-matching guarantees might be concerned that they are being used to
6

facilitate collusion.

Finally, an additional nding in this article is that price-matching guarantees may lead to
a multitude of asymmetric equilibria where otherwise homogeneous rms have dierent
pricing strategies. In such equilibria, one rm sells to more shoppers, whereas the other
plays a pricing strategy that leads it to sell to more non-shoppers. As the disparity in the
proportion of each consumer segment that rms serve grows, rm prots increase at the

6 Recently, certain brick and mortar businesses have begun matching on-line competitors. For instance,
Toys R Us states that it will match Walmart.com, Amazon.com, and other selected online competitors.
Moreover, the increasing use of smartphone technology makes it easier to oer proof of a rival's lower
price.

8

expense of consumers. The higher the proportion of non-shoppers a rm serves, the more
prot it will lose from these captive consumers by lowering its price to attract shoppers,
and the less inclined it is to do so. The upward shift in this rm's price distribution implies that the rm that focuses on catering to shoppers does not need to lower prices as
much to expect to capture the same proportion of them and its price distribution shifts
upward as well. Hence, the more asymmetry that price-matching entails, the greater the
welfare loss to consumers.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model and
equilibrium concept. Section 2.3 characterizes consumer search behavior. Section 2.4 solves
for equilibrium when price-matching is imposed exogenously. Section 2.5 characterizes the
complete market equilibrium when shoppers do not direct their search (that is, shoppers'
search path is random). Section 2.6 numerically examines the consequences of asymmetric
equilibria that prevail when shopper search is directed (and asymmetric). Section 2.7
concludes. All formal proofs are contained in a Supplemental Appendix.

2.2 Model and Equilibrium
With the exception of the framework for the acquisition of price information, our modeling assumptions are standard in the price-matching literature. Two rms, labeled 1 and
2, sell a homogeneous good. Firms face no capacity constraints and have an identical constant cost of 0 of producing one unit of the good. There is a unit mass of almost identical
consumers with inelastic (unit) demand and valuation

v>0

for the good.

Consumers are a priori uninformed about prices, but they can learn about them through
search. Following Stahl (1989), we assume that a proportion

µ ∈ (0, 1)

of the consumers

have 0 search cost. These consumers are viewed as having no opportunity cost of time
and are henceforth referred to as shoppers. The remaining

9

1−µ

consumers, called non-

shoppers, pay search cost
7

rst.

c ∈ (0, v)

for each rm they visit with the exception of the

Search is sequential with costless revisits. After observing the price at the rst rm

for free, consumers decide whether or not to search the next one or to exit the market altogether. Consumers who have visited both rms may freely choose the cheapest price ob8

served.

In a model without price-matching, shoppers freely sample both prices and always buy
from the rm with the lower listed price, but in a model where rms publicly announce
oers to price-match, after sampling both prices, shoppers might choose to invoke a pricematching guarantee to purchase the product from a rm with the higher listed price. A
shopper might, for instance, wish above all to procure the product at the lowest price,
but given the opportunity, to do so at a particular rm (perhaps because of store brand
preference or favorable store characteristics that are unrelated to the product being purchased). Such a shopper could then rst sample the competing price and if necessary,
invoke a price-match guarantee at the preferred rm rather than going back to the competitor. Alternatively, certain shoppers who have ended their shopping trip at the higherpriced rm may be deal-prone (e.g., Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Burton 1990; DelVecchio
2005), valuing not only the ability to secure the lowest price, but also the opportunity to
purchase a good at a discount o the listed price. These shoppers strictly prefer the pricematch deal to a return trip to the lower priced rm.

9

7 The assumption that the rst visit is free is standard in the literature and we interpret it to mean
that the non-shopper initially believes that he must have the good and treats the cost of the rst visit as
sunk. Janssen, Moraga-Gonzàlez, and Wildenbeest (2005) analyze a sequential search model with costly
initial visits.

8 One way to interpret the search cost is as a cost of nding out the price in a particular rm for the

rst time rather than as the cost of traveling there. Janssen and Parakhonyak (2014) show that when second visits are costly in a Stahl oligopoly search model, rms nevertheless use pricing strategies that are
identical to the perfect recall case.

9 A third explanation for invoking price-matching guarantees follows if instead of interpreting shoppers

as having no opportunity cost of time, we treat them as individuals who read sales ads (Varian 1980) or as
users of price-comparison sites (Janssen and Non 2008). In this case, if we think of some shoppers as gravitating toward their local rm unless its competitor oers the lower price, then such shoppers could use a
price-matching guarantee to avoid traveling to the non-local rm. We thank a reader for this suggestion.

10

However, in reality, not all shoppers would choose to price-match given the opportunity.
Regardless of how dierent consumers value their time, some simply do not pay attention
to price-matching announcements,

10

whereas others may nd the act of keeping and track-

ing price ads or the additional other activity needed to procure a price-match in some way
distastefulor as the literature often terms it, a hassle. Moreover, even if all shoppers observe price-matching announcements and nd the application of a price-matching guarantee to be a hassle free activity, some shoppers may be unable to invoke a guarantee due
to the discretion of a store worker who is unwilling to provide the match even though her
employer has announced a price-matching policy.

11

In order to account for the possibility that some shoppers would prefer to invoke a pricematching guarantee at the last store visited while others would prefer to purchase at a
store that lists the lower price, we assume that when the two rms oer dierent prices,

θS ∈ [0, 1]

of shoppers face some impediment to using price-matching guarantees (e.g.,

they are unaware that the guarantees are available or nd price-matching a hassle) and always purchase from the rm with the lower listed price instead.

12

The remaining

1 − θS

shoppers will invoke a price-matching guarantee at the last rm they stopped in when one
is available and necessary to obtain the lower price there and purchase from the rm with
the lower listed price otherwise.

13

10 It is not uncommon in the advertising literature to assume that some portion of consumers will remain unaware of certain attributes of a product or rm even when they are familiar with the product's
price. For instance, Meurer and Stahl (1994) assume that buyers are aware of the prices of all existing
products, but may not know which product oers the best match. Firms may advertise to inform consumers whether the product is a good match, but some consumers remain uninformed in equilibrium.

11 For instance, Bloomberg has reported that workers at certain chains known for their price-matching

policies, nevertheless may not execute the policies consistently. See Dudley, R., Rupp, L. Price Matching
Criticized From Wal-Mart to Toys `R' Us: Retail. Bloomberg. April 30, 2013. Retrieved February 28,
2014.

hhttp://bloom.bg/ZhGPisi.

12 We may, as done in Hviid and Shaer (1999), treat this impediment as a hassle cost

a price-matching guarantee. However, because no shopper would ever pay
equationit suces to treat

θS

z it

z≥0

of invoking

does not appear in any

as a type of tie-breaking rule.

13 In principle, when one rm charges a lower price and its competitor oers a price-matching guar-

antee,

1 − θS represents the proportion of shoppers who are indierent between these two rms (the reθS strictly preferring the rm charging a lower price due to impediments to price-matching). Our

maining

11

When

θS = 1

(no shoppers invoke price-matching guarantees), it is easy to show that the

equilibrium outcome reduces to that in Stahl (1989), such that we will generally limit our
analysis to

θS < 1.

Although we analyze equilibrium when

there is reason to believe that empirically,
sis, we often focus on equilibria where

θS

is higher.

14

θS = 0

(see Proposition 4),

Therefore, throughout our analy-

θS ∈ (0, 1).

In order to capture the idea that a rm may develop a reputation for price-matching, we
suppose that the game proceeds in three stages, as follows:

1. In stage one, rms simultaneously decide whether to adopt a price-matching guarantee. A rm that has adopted such a guarantee pre-commits itself to sell the good at
the minimum listed price to consumers who have observed both prices and are hence
able to invoke the guarantee. A rm that has not committed to price-match at this
15

stage does not oer customers a price-matching guarantee in the price search stage.

2. In the second stage, each rm's price-matching decision is known to all agents in the
model. Firms then simultaneously choose prices, taking into consideration their beliefs about rival rm strategies as well as consumer search behavior. A pricing strattie-breaking rule presumes that such shoppers purchase from the last rm they visit as long as they can
obtain the lower price there. One may rationalize this assumption by supposing that

θS

subsumes not only

those shoppers who face an impediment to invoking a price-matching guarantee, but also indierent shoppers who always purchase from the rm listing the lower price. Alternatively, we could assume that

1 − θS

shoppers obtain some additional deal value from invoking a price-matching guarantee. Doing so would
require certain modications to our prot equations that would nevertheless preserve all of our ndings.

14 To our knowledge, Moorthy and Winter (2006) provide the only published data measuring the fre-

quency with which price-matching guarantees are invoked in a retail setting. They nd that redemption
rates rarely surpass 10 percent in their retailer survey and average 5.8 percent, with a median of 5 percent. In contrast, recent empirical studies which seek to estimate search costs nd that the percentage of
consumers who search more than one rm is signicantly higher than 10 percent. For instance, MoragaGonzàlez and Wildenbeest (2008) estimate that between 70 and 78 percent of consumers in the market
for personal computer memory chips search more than once. De los Santos (2012) nds that 24 percent of
searches leading to a transaction in the on-line book market visit more than one bookstore. This suggests
that not all shoppers would invoke price-match guarantees when they could.

15 In practice, some rms may oer price-matching guarantees without advertising an intent to price-

match, in which case some consumers may unexpectedly happen upon the guarantees during the search
process. Such rms are outside the scope of this article. Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013) study rms that
make their price-matching decisions simultaneously with their pricing decisions, exclusively focusing on
price-matching rms that don't announce their intent to price-match.
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egy consists of a price distribution
rm

i

oers a price no higher than

port of the distribution for rm

i

Fi ,

where

Fi (p)

p.

The lower bound and upper bound of the sup-

are denoted as

pi

represents the probability that

and

p̄i ,

respectively.

3. After prices have been realized, consumers choose optimal search strategies given
their beliefs about each

Throughout, parameters

Fi .

v , c, µ ,

and

θS ,

as well as the rationality of all agents in the model

are commonly known.
The equilibrium concept used is Sequential Equilibrium. Intuitively, we can think of consumers who observe an o-equilibrium price at the rst rm they sample as treating such
deviations as mistakes when forming beliefs about the remaining rm's strategy. That is,
consumers believe that unsampled rms play their equilibrium strategies at all information
sets.

2.3 Consumer Search Behavior
Shoppers freely search both rms before making their purchase decision. For non-shoppers,
it is well known that in models such as the one we have set up, the optimal search rule is
to sample rms in ascending order of magnitude of the reservation price associated with
searching each rm, with equal reservation prices implying indierence (this is known
as Weitzman's 1979 Pandora's Rule). Moreover, the optimal stopping rule is for a non-

j

shopper who has freely observed the price at rm
observed price is higher than a reservation price,
searching rm

i

to continue search if and only if the

ri ,

which makes him indierent between
16

and stopping. This reservation price is then dened as the solution to

Z

ri

Z

ri

(ri − p)dFi (p) =

Fi (p)dp = c
pi

pi

16 The rst equality follows from integration by parts as long as there is no mass at
to Proposition 1 below, is always the case.
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(2.1)

pi ,

which according

Note that reservation price

j

ri

corresponds to non-shoppers who begin their search at rm

and vice versa because non-shoppers who begin at rm

i

to search rm

based on the price they observed at rm

j

must decide whether or not

j

and their beliefs about rm

i's

pricing strategy.
Suppose that

r1 = r2

in equilibriumthat is, non-shoppers are indierent regarding the

search order. If both rms choose the same action in the rst stageboth match, or neither doesin the absence of additional a priori information about the rms, it is natural
to suppose that the initial search would be random and that half of each type of consumer
would visit each rm rst. However, if one rm matches while the other does not and all
consumers randomize their rst search, as will be seen in Section 2.4, rms will set prices
such that non-shoppers would prefer to search the non-matching rm rst, a contradiction.
Therefore, indierence requires some consumers to place greater probability on sampling
the non-matching rm in equilibrium. Moreover, even if both rms choose the same rst
stage action, equilibria where heterogeneous consumers who are indierent sample the two
rms with dierent probabilities may exist (such as where one rm ends up selling to more
shoppers and the other to more non-shoppers). To account for such asymmetries, we suppose that in equilibrium, shoppers and non-shoppers search rm 1 with respective probabilities

βS

and

βN ,

where

βS , βN : B → [0, 1]

and where

B = [0, v] × (0, 1) × [0, 1]

Cartesian product of the intervals that contain parameters
ing forward, we omit the arguments on

r1 6= r2 ,

βS

and

βN .

c, µ ,

and

θS .

is the

For concision, go-

We note that in an equilibrium where

so that non-shoppers strictly prefer to begin search at a particular rm,

βN

equals

0 or 1.
Because shoppers will obtain the lowest price regardless of where they begin their search,
to add structure to our model, in a number of propositions below we focus on equilibria
where shoppers' search path is random (βS
we focus on equilibria where

r1 = r2

= 1/2).

Moreover, from Propositions 1 to 6,

(non-shoppers are indierent between which rm to

14

sample rst, though the search path is not necessarily random), whereas in Proposition 7
we characterize equilibria where

r1 6= r2 .

In Section 2.6 we examine equilibria where

βS 6=

1/2.

2.4 Firm Pricing Strategies
Working backwards, in this section, we derive equilibria in the four possible subgames that
follow rms' price-matching decisions: the subgame where neither rm price-matches,
the subgame where both rms price-match, and the two subgames where only one rm
matches. In Section 2.5, we compare the outcomes that prevail in each of the pricing subgames to determine rms' optimal price-matching policies.
Proposition 1 below states that in general, rms do not play pure pricing strategies in
equilibrium.

17

It also places limitations on the way that rms may price in equilibrium,

and consequently on the way that consumers search. It tells us that regardless of rms'
price-matching decisions, rms will generally not oer a price higher than the largest possible price of their competitors, nor a price high enough to induce non-shoppers to search
more than one rm. The proof, which borrows heavily from standard mass shifting arguments found in Narasimhan (1988), Stahl (1989) and Janssen and Non (2008), is highly
involved. Therefore, in the Supplemental Appendix, we provide a sketch of the intuition
18

that references these articles in addition to a complete proof.

Proposition 1. Suppose that all consumers are indierent regarding which rm to sample
rst and that in the event that both rms oer price-matching guarantees, θS 6= 0. Then
in equilibrium, rms play mixed pricing strategies over the same supports. The supports do
not contain any breaks, they are bounded from above by p̄ = min {v, r} where r = r1 = r2 ,
17 The lone exception occurs when both rms oer price-matching guarantees on the equilibrium path
and

θS = 0.

This is explored in Proposition 4.

18 As is discussed in footnote 24, the qualication that consumers are indierent regarding which rm to

sample is not technically necessary, but is useful for the purpose of exposition.
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and at most one rm may have one mass point at p̄. If a mass point exists in equilibrium,
then non-shoppers who sample rm i rst, must stop searching after observing a price of rj
unless v < rj .
As will be seen below, the equilibrium outcome is symmetric if and only if all consumers
choose their rst price sample at random (βS

= βN = 1/2).

In this case, because ac-

cording to Proposition 1, at most one rm may have a mass point in equilibrium, when
the equilibrium outcome is symmetric, there are no mass points and both rms always run
salesthat is, they price below

p̄

with probability 1. Alternatively, the equilibrium may

be asymmetric, in which case one rm has a mass point at
ing to Proposition 1 a price equal to

r

p̄.

Note that because accord-

and strictly higher than

v

is only observed o the

equilibrium path, in equilibrium, non-shoppers whose rst observation equals

r

(and who

are hence indierent between stopping and searching the next rm) stop. Therefore, because rms never price above

r,

as in Stahl (1989), non-shoppers only sample one price in

equilibrium. This means that in equilibrium, price-matching can only impact non-shoppers
indirectly because a consumer cannot use a price-matching guarantee without observing a
second price.

19

In the following two subsections, we analyze equilibria in subgames where both rms make
the same price-matching decision. We conclude that in a subgame where both rms oer
price-matching guarantees, consumers expect higher prices and rms expect higher prots
than in a subgame without price-matching.

19 In this respect, we dier from Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013), who assume that an exogenous proportion of non-shoppers discovers the rival rm's price post-purchase without further search. These nonshoppers are then assumed to invoke a price-matching guarantee at the rst store if the rival's price is
lower.
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2.4.1

Neither Firm Price-Matches

Following Stahl (1989), Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2014) show that in the subgame
without matching, there is a unique Sequential Equilibrium where both rms distribute
prices over support
where

[(1 − µ) p̄/(1 + µ), p̄]

p̄ = min {v, r∗ }
r∗ =

and

r∗ ,

with distribution


F (p) = (1 + µ) 1 − p/p / (2µ),

the equilibrium reservation price, is dened as




r (µ, c) = c 1 −

1−µ
2µ

ln

1+µ
1−µ

−1

if

∞




r (µ, c) ≤ v
(2.2)
otherwise

In equilibrium, regardless of shoppers' search order, shoppers will always purchase from
the rm with the lower listed price. On the other hand, non-shoppers randomly choose to
sample one rm and because

p̄ = min {v, r∗ },

without observing the price of the other rm.

20

they purchase from the rst rm sampled
Thus, as in Stahl (1989) rms randomize

over lower prices to attract shoppers, and over higher prices to extract greater prots from
captive non-shoppers.

2.4.2

Both Firms Price-Match

When both rms oer price-matching guarantees, the expected prot that each rm obtains from shoppers diers markedly from that when price-matching is not available. Consider the expected prot equation for rm 1 when both rms oer to price-match:

E[π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 ))] = (1 − µ) βN p1

(2.3)

+µ {p1 (βS θS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}
20 Hence, the equilibrium outcome is the same for all

F (p)

above), whereas

βN = 1/2

βS ∈ [0, 1] (βS

is absent in Equation (2.2) and

in equilibrium. Suppose this were not the case. From Astorne-Figari and

Yankelevich (2014), we know that when

βN 6= 1/2 (λ

in their article), the price distribution of the rm

that more non-shoppers choose to sample rst, rst order stochastically dominates that of its rival. This
would imply that the reservation price associated with the rival rm is lower, such that all non-shoppers
would prefer to sample the rm with the dominated distribution rst, a contradiction.
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Suppose that rm 1 sets price

p1 .

From Proposition 1, we know that the

shoppers who sample rm 1 rst stay there and pay
match, with probability

1 − F2 (p1 ), p1 < p2

p1 .

(1 − µ)βN

non-

When neither rm oers to price-

and rm 1 sells to every shopper in the mar-

ket. Otherwise it does not sell to shoppers. However, when both rms oer price-matching
guarantees, as can be observed by decomposing the second line of Equation (2.3), the order in which rms are sampled matters and rm 1 cannot expect to capture every shopper
by listing a lower price.
When

p1 < p2 ,

rm 1 captures

µ(1 − βS )

shoppers who previously sampled rm 2 and

discovered a lower price in rm 1 as well as

µβS θS

shoppers who rst sample the price of

rm 1 and upon learning the price of rm 2, purchase from rm 1 rather than invoke a
price-matching guarantee at rm 2. Each of these shoppers pay

p1

to rm 1. The remain-

ing shoppers invoke a price-matching guarantee at rm 2. However, although rm 1 may
lose some shoppers that it would have captured with a lower price sans price-matching
guarantees, by oering to price-match, it hedges its losses when it ends up with a higher
price than rm 2 because some shoppers will invoke a price-match guarantee at rm 1. In
particular, with probability
ple

p1

F2 (p1 ),

we know that

rst all purchase from rm 2, but the

p1 ≥ p2 .

In this case, shoppers who sam-

µ(1−θS )(1−βS )

shoppers who visit rm 2 rst

will invoke a price-matching guarantee upon sampling rm 1 and paying rm 2's expected
price to rm 1 (that is,

E [p2 |p2 < p1 ]).

In Proposition 2 we characterize the Sequential Equilibria for the subgame where both
rms oer price-matching guarantees and

θS ∈ (0, 1].

The proposition indicates that

price-matching can inuence prices in three ways: (i) directly by altering rms' price distribution functions, (ii) indirectly via the reservation price, and (iii) through its eect on
the sampling order of individual consumers, as represented by
characterizes equilibria where

βS ≥ 1/2.

Equilibria where

18

βS

and

βS < 1/2

βN .

Proposition 2

follow analogously.

Proposition 2. Suppose that rms are exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees, all consumers are indierent regarding which rm to sample rst, and θS ∈ (0, 1].
Then in equilibrium, both rms distribute prices over support
"

 
∗
p, p̄ = min {v, r }

(1 − µ) βN
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN

θS
S θS +1−βS

#

β

∗

, min {v, r }

and the equilibrium reservation price, r∗ = r1∗ = r2∗ equals


r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) if r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) ≤ v
∗
r =
,


∞
otherwise
(
θS
[(1 − µ) βN ] βS θS +1−βS
r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) = c 1 −
µ (1 − βS ) (1 − θS )
 )−1

(1−βS )(1−θS )
(1−βS )(1−θS )
× [µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN ] 1−βS (1−θS ) − [(1 − µ) βN ] 1−βS (1−θS )

Suppose that rm 1 has a mass point at p̄. Then it distributes prices according to



  (1−βSθ)θS +βS

p
S
(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
1 −

F1 (p) = 1 +
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ]
p

over p, p̄ , while rm 2 distributes prices according to






(1 − µ) βN
F2 (p) = 1 +
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS )

"
  βS θSθ+1−βS #
p
S
1−
p

In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two rms equal each other.
Following Stahl (1989), the proof of this proposition proceeds by using rms' indierence
between all actions in the supports of their distribution functions to solve for distributions

F1

and

F2

and then by applying the distributions to non-shoppers' optimal stop-

ping rule (Equation (2.1)) to solve for the reservation price. The dierence in this article
is that when rms oer to price-match, the changes in consumer shopping behavior following Equation (2.3) substantively alter rms' indierence conditions via their expected
prot equations. This changes rms' price distributions as well as non-shoppers' reserva-
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tion price.
Non-shopper indierence between which rm to sample rst leads to the following set of
equations:

Z

r2

r2

Z
F2 (p)dp =

F1 (p)dp


Z r2
Z x
⇔
pdF2 (p) = lim
pdF1 (p) + p̄ 1 − lim F1 (x)
p

p

x→r2 −

p

(2.4)

x→r2 −

p

The rst equation follows from Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule and non-shoppers' indifference (so

r2 = r1 = r);

the second, which sets the expected price of the two rms equal

to each other, follows from integration by parts together with the fact that
in equilibrium. Using the expected price equality,
solve for
If

βN

it is readily seen that the unique value of

also equals

1/2.

It also follows that,
at

p̄.

we can now implicitly

as a function of the remaining parameters.

βS = 1/2,

E2 [p]

E1 [p] = E2 [p],

p̄ =min {v, r}

βN ∈ [0, 1]

that solves

E1 [p] = E2 [p] = E [p] where
2θS 

1−θS
1−θS
p̄ (1 − µ) 1+θS
(1 + µθS ) 1+θS − (1 − µ) 1+θS
E [p] =
µ (1 − θS )

E1 [p] =

In this case,

F1 (p) = F2 (p),

(2.5)

and consequently, that neither rm has a mass point

This establishes existence. Although the symmetric equilibrium is perhaps the most

natural one when both rms price-matchconsumers choose the rst price sample at random in the absence of any information dierentiating the two rmsthe equilibrium is
not unique, and in Section 2.6, we numerically explore the existence of equilibria where

βS > 1/2

(and as a consequence,

βN > 1/2).

Our next two resultsPropositions 3 and 4make more precise the eect that price-matching
has on rms' price distribution functions and non-shoppers' reservation price.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that rms are exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees and βS = βN = 1/2.
1. Then in equilibrium, a rm price distribution with a lower proportion of shoppers µ
or lower proportion of shoppers who ignore price-matching guarantees θS dominates
one with a higher proportion in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
2. If r∗ < v, then r∗ is decreasing in µ and in θS .
Because

p̄ = min {v, r∗ },

as was the case when rms did not oer price-matching guaran-

tees, in any equilibrium described in Proposition 2, non-shoppers choose a rm to search
rst and make a purchase there, whereas all shoppers search both rms and obtain the
lower price. However, contrary to the subgame without matching, the lower price is not always obtained at the rm with the lower listed price. For instance, as noted above, if rm
1 has the lower listed price, the
from rm 1, but of the
while

µβS (1 − θS )

µβS

µ(1 − βS )

shoppers who search rm 2 rst all purchase

shoppers who search rm 1 rst,

µβS θS

purchase from rm 1

obtain a price-match at rm 2. This inability to capture all shoppers at

the lower listed price diminishes rms' incentive to set lower pricesand more so the lower

θS .
The rst-order stochastic dominance relationship in Part (1) of Proposition 3 together
with Equation (2.1) imply that the lower
When

βS = βN = 1/2,

θS ,

the higher the equilibrium reservation price.

a simple application of l'Hôpital's rule will show that Equa-

tion (2.2) is the limit of the equilibrium reservation price in Proposition 2 as

θS

approaches

one (as the proportion of shoppers who invoke a price-matching guarantee goes to zero).
According to Proposition 3, Part (2), for any

θS < 1,

the latter reservation price is never

lower than the former. This means that a price that could induce a non-shopper to search
in an equilibrium without price-matching might no longer do so in an equilibrium with
matchingthat is, non-shoppers may be willing to accept higher prices in lieu of search in
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a symmetric equilibrium with price-matching. Thus, when consumers engage in optimal
search, the price increasing eect of price-matching guarantees is exacerbatedsearch is
inhibited over a wider range of prices for a subset of the population.
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 tell us that price-matching guarantees do not oer a price
benet to consumers because a portion of consumers never uses them, while the remainder could procure the lower listed price with or without them.
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This stands in contrast

to existing studies such as those of Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001) and Janssen and
Parakhonyak (2013), in which price-matching guarantees potentially allow consumers who
would otherwise remain relatively uninformed to pay a lower listed price. Our ndings appear to us more cogent because individuals who nd search costly are likely to nd satisfying the non-pecuniary requirements that many rms impose on price-matching customers
costly as well, so we would not expect such individuals to rely on price-matching guarantees (one might for instance suppose that in addition to paying search cost

c,

all non-

shoppers nd price-matching a hassle, though this is unnecessary because non-shoppers
observe a single price in equilibrium). Conversely, an individual who does not nd the use
of a price-matching guarantee a hassle is also likely to be an individual who is willing to
shop around for price.
More generally, Proposition 3 tells us that the greater the proportion of shoppers who invoke price-matching guarantees, the higher the price that any consumer is likely to face.
This is consistent with the experimental results of Dugar and Sorensen (2006), who nd
that as the number of positive hassle cost buyers in the market is reduced, average market
price approaches the monopoly price in a monotonic fashion. The next proposition says
that when

θS = 0that

is, all shoppers invoke price-matching guarantees when they are

availableprice-matching leads to a unique monopolistic equilibrium.

21 The only potential benet accrues to deal-prone shoppers who invoke price-matching guarantees in
terms of any intrinsic value that they derive from the deal.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that rms are exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees and θS = 0. Then there exists a unique Sequential Equilibrium where both rms set
price v and r1∗ = r2∗ = v + c.
Intuitively, when

θS = 0,

22

lower prices do not attract additional customers. In particu-

lar, shoppers who encounter a higher price at the second rm they search will use a pricematching guarantee at the second rm rather than go back to the rst rm to obtain a
lower price. As a result, rms extract all consumer welfare by pricing at
At the opposite extreme, when
case, if we set

βS = βN = 1/2

θS = 1,

v.

no one invokes price-matching guarantees. In this

and substitute

θS = 1

into Equations (2.3) and rms' price

distribution functions in Proposition 2, we obtain respectively, rms' prots and price distributions in the subgame without matching. Proposition 3 shows that the distribution
when

θS = 1

is strictly dominated by any symmetric distribution where some shoppers

invoke price-matching guarantees. This immediately leads to the following result:

Corollary 1. In a symmetric equilibrium where both rms oer price-matching guarantees
and some shoppers invoke them, expected prices and prots are higher than in an equilibrium without price-matching.

2.4.3

Only Firm 1 Price-Matches

In this subsection we examine equilibria that arise when rm 1 is exogenously required to
oer price-matching guarantees while rm 2 is required not to. The analysis when only
rm 2 is exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees is analogous.

22 We note that the assumption of costless rst visits is not innocuous here. Janssen, Moraga-Gonzàlez,
and Wildenbeest (2005) show that when non-shoppers have to pay for every price quote, full participation,
which is presumed here, requires

v

to be no lower than rms' reservation prices.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that rm 1 is exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees while rm 2 is required not to and that all consumers are indierent regarding which
rm to sample rst. Then in equilibrium, both rms distribute prices over support


 
∗
p, p̄ = min {v, r }

(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )




, min {v, r }
∗

and the equilibrium reservation price, r∗ = r1∗ = r2∗ equals
r∗ =



r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN )

if r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) ≤ v

,
otherwise
(1 − µ)(1 − βN )
µ[(1 − βS )θS + βS ] −1
r(µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) = c{1 −
× ln{1 +
}}
µ[(1 − βS )θS + βS ]
(1 − µ)(1 − βN )
∞




Firm 1 distributes prices according to




p
(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
F1 (p) = 1 +
1−
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ]
p

while rm 2 distributes prices according to

"
  β +θ 1−β θ #
p S S SS
(1 − µ) βN
F2 (p) = 1 +
1−
µ
p

over p, p̄ with a mass point at p̄. In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two rms




equal each other.
As in the equilibria described in Proposition 2, non-shoppers randomly choose a rm to
search rst and make a purchase there. We continue our focus on equilibria where shoppers randomly choose their initial price sample (βS
that

βN < 1/2implying

= 1/2).

When

βS = 1/2,

it must be

that more non-shoppers purchase from the non-matching rm.

Suppose this were not the case. Then, rm 1, which oers price-matching guarantees, expects to sell to more shoppers than rm 2, and to at least as many non-shoppers. But this
would lead rm 1 to place greater probability on higher prices than rm 2, breaking the
equality between reservation prices (or alternatively, expected prices) needed to make consumers indierent between which rm to sample rst.
Even assuming

βS = 1/2,

the equilibrium value of
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βN

cannot be solved for explicitly as

µ

a function of
for

E1 [p]

and

and

E2 [p]

θS

by using expected price equality

E1 [p] = E2 [p]

are written in full in the proof of Proposition 5 in the Supplemental

Appendix). However, because

E1 [p]

and

E2 [p]

are both smooth functions in

we are able to verify existence of an equilibrium value of
grid. To do so, we compute
space

(the expressions

βN

for 10,000

µ × θS ⊂ (0, 1) × (0, 1).

(µ, θS )

βN ∈ [0, 1/2)

µ

and

θS ,

numerically on a

pairs spaced evenly over the parameter
23

We employ this approach in Figures 2.1 through 2.4.

The shaded region in Figure 2.1 represents the set of

µ

and

θS

such that

βS = 1/2

and

the equilibrium described in Proposition 5 exists, whereas Figure 2.4(a) displays the value
of

βN

that leads to equilibrium for each of the

makes apparent that

µ.

When

θS

βN ∈ [0, 1/2),

grows or

µ

(µ, θS )

and moreover that

pairs in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.4(a)

βN

increases in

θS ,

but decreases in

shrinks, rm 1's ability to maintain higher prices via shoppers who

invoke price-matching guarantees diminishes. In equilibrium,

βN

must then grow to make

consumers indierent between which rm to sample rst.

1
0.8

ΘS

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Μ

Figure 2.1:

Set of

µ

and

θS

Such That Equilibrium With

βS = 0.5

and

βN ∈ (0, 0.5)

Exists When Only Firm 1 Matches.

23 An annotated program that performs these calculations is available upon request from the authors.
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(a)

(b)

βN

r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN )

Figure 2.2:

(a)

Because rm 2 has a mass point at
rm 1for instance,

p̄

p̄,

βN

and (b)

r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN )

it may be thought of as running fewer sales than

may be interpreted as a manufacturer's suggested retail price and a

discount from that price could be called a sale. However, even though rm 2 runs sales less
frequently than rm 1, because expected prices are equal in equilibrium, when rm 2 does
run sales, it will tend to oer greater discounts than rm 1. In the next section, we will
consider how rm prots (and hence expected prices) in the equilibria of this subsection
compare to prots when neither or both rms price-match.
Proposition 6 represent the comparative static counterpart to Proposition 3 when only
rm 1 oers a price-matching guarantee.

Proposition 6. Suppose that rm 1 is exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees while rm 2 is required not to, βS = 1/2, and βN ∈ (0, 1/2).
1. Then in equilibrium, for rm 1 a price distribution with a lower proportion of shoppers, µ, dominates one with a higher proportion in the sense of rst-order stochas26

tic dominance if and only if

∂βN
∂µ

1−βN
> − µ(1−µ)
. A distribution with a lower proportion

of shoppers who ignore price-matching guarantees, θS , dominates one with a higher
proportion if and only if

∂βN
∂θS

N
> − 1−β
. Moreover, expected prices for both rms
1+θS

are decreasing in µ if and only if
if

∂βN
∂θS

∂βN
∂µ

1−βN
> − µ(1−µ)
and decreasing in θS if and only

N
> − 1−β
.
1+θS

2. If r∗ < v, then r∗ is decreasing in µ if and only if
θS if and only if

∂βN
∂θS

∂βN
∂µ

1−βN
> − µ(1−µ)
and decreasing in

N
> − 1−β
.
1+θS

By applying the implicit function theorem to

E1 [p] − E2 [p] = 0,

we can determine

∂βN
and
∂µ

∂βN
. Unfortunately, this yields a pair of highly unwieldy equations, and as an alternative,
∂θS
we numerically compute the reservation price over the set of

µ

and

θS

for which an equi-

librium of the type described in Proposition 5 exists (the shaded region in Figure 2.1) to
determine whether or not the inequalities in Proposition 6 hold. These computations are
displayed in Figure 2.2(b), which shows the equilibrium reservation price decreasing over
all

µ

and

tion in

µ

θS ,

as in Proposition 3, Part (2). Because

and

θS ,

r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN )

is a smooth func-

Figure 2.2(b) tells us that the inequalities in Proposition 6 always hold in

the shaded region in Figure 2.1, so that the equilibrium reservation price is increasing with
the proportion of shoppers who invoke price-matching guarantees and moreover, according
to Proposition 6, Part (1), so is the expected price.
Although our focus thus far has been on equilibria where consumers who have no price information are indierent between which rm to sample rst, as can be observed in Figure
2.1, assuming

βS = 1/2,

there is a subset of

µ

and

θS

where such an equilibrium does not

exist. In Proposition 7, we characterize the equilibrium that prevails throughout the remainder of the

µ × θS

parameter space when

βS = 1/2.

We then show that the equilibria

characterized in Propositions 5 and 7 partition this space.
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Proposition 7. Suppose that rm 1 is exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees while rm 2 is required not to and βS = 1/2.
1. An equilibrium in which non-shoppers all prefer to sample rm 1 rst does not exist.
2. For suciently low θS and suciently high µ, there exists an equilibrium where all
non-shoppers prefer to sample rm 2 rst, in which both rms distribute prices over
support


 
∗
p, p̄ = min {v, r2 }



2 (1 − µ)
∗
, min {v, r2 }
2 − µ (1 − θS )

and the equilibrium reservation, r2∗ , equals
r2∗ =



r2 (µ, θS , c)
∞



1 − θS
r2 (µ, θS , c) = c
1 + θS

if r2 (µ, θS , c) ≤ v

(

,

otherwise

2 (1 − µ)
2 − µ (1 − θS )

 1+θ2

S

)−1
2µ
+
−1
2 − µ (1 − θS )

Firm 1 distributes prices according to
2 − µ (1 − θS )
F1 (p) =
µ (1 + θS )



p
1−
p

while rm 2 distributes prices according to
  1+θ2
p
S
F2 (p) = 1 −
p

over p, p̄ with a mass point at p̄. In equilibrium, rm 1's reservation price and ex



pected price is no lower than those of rm 2.
Regarding Part (1), we already knew that when

βS = 1/2,

it must be that

βN < 1/2,

so

we should not expect an equilibrium where non-shoppers all prefer to sample rm 1 rst
to exist (which would imply

βN = 1).

With regard to Part (2), it is worth noting that

the price distributions in Proposition 7 are the limits of the price distributions in Proposition 5 as

βN → 0,

holding

βS = 1/2.

Additionally, assuming that
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v

is not binding, in

equilibrium,

r1 (µ, θS , c)

equals



2 (1 − µ)
2 − µ (1 − θS )
r1 (µ, θS , c) = c + r2 (µ, θS , c)
ln
µ (1 + θS )
2 (1 − µ)
As a consequence,

(2.6)

r1 (µ, θS , c) > r2 (µ, θS , c) occurs if and only if



2 (1 − µ)
2 − µ (1 − θS )
c > r2 (µ, θS , c) 1 −
ln
µ (1 + θS )
2 (1 − µ)

where it can be observed that

c

(2.7)

divided by the bracketed expression in the right hand

side of Inequality (2.7) is the limit of the equilibrium reservation price in Proposition 5
as

βN → 0,

holding

βS = 1/2.

This means that when

tions 5 and 7 partition the space

βS = 1/2,

µ × θS ⊂ (0, 1) × (0, 1).

the equilibria in Proposi-

That is, when shopper sampling

order is random in an equilibrium where only rm 1 oers to price-match, non-shoppers
are either indierent regarding which rm to sample rst or they strictly prefer to sample
rm 2 rst. In the latter case, Equation (2.4) indicates that non-shoppers expect to pay a
lower price at the non-matching rm, so that for a subset of parameters, the non-matching
rm behaves like a low price competitor to its price-matching rival.
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2.5 Market Equilibrium
In the rst stage of the game, rms must decide whether or not to make a price-matching
announcement. For each rm, this decision depends on a comparison of the prots that
it expects to obtain in each of the pricing subgames discussed in the previous section. In
this section, we continue to focus on equilibria where

βS = 1/2;

that is, shoppers ran-

domly choose which rm's price to sample rst before moving on to the second rm. This

24 The claims proving Proposition 1 in the Supplemental Appendix suggest that when
ditional equilibria may exist on the set

µ × θS

βN = 0 ,

ad-

when the assumption regarding consumer indierence is

omitted from the proposition. These equilibria can be ruled out numerically. For instance, if rm 1 is the
matching rm and

r2 < r1

βN = 0,

Proposition 1 sans the indierence assumption posits an equilibrium in which

in which both rms have a mass point at the upper bound of their supports. However, numeri-

cally, we have found that for any value of

Pr (p2 = p̄2 ) ∈ (0, 1), r1 < r2

in such an equilibrium, a contra-

diction (additional detail is available upon request from the authors). Thus, when
to concentrate on the equilibria described in Propositions 5 and 7.
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βS = 1/2,

we need only

follows naturally if shoppers observe either that both rms oer price-matching guarantees, or that neither one does, in which case there is no information about the prices of the
individual rms to be gleaned from the rst stage. However, even if one rm announces
its guarantee to match the other rm's price, while the other does not, at the end of their
search, shoppers will nevertheless procure the lowest price available, so that randomization
is a reasonable search strategy. Going forward, we assume that

v

is large enough not to

be binding on rm supports (and thus, as a result of Proposition 4, we must assume that

θS 6= 0).
Fortunately, when

βS = 1/2,

because the stage-two pricing equilibria when both rms

make the same stage-one matching decision are symmetric, as displayed in the payo matrix labeled Table 2.1, our analysis boils down to a pair of prot comparisons over the set

µ × θS :

(i) a comparison of the matching rm's expected prot when only one rm of-

fers a price-matching guarantee

NM
MN
= E πM
E πM

when neither rm price-matches

E πN N ,

against the symmetric expected prot

and (ii) a comparison of the non-matching rm's

expected prot when only one rm oers a price-matching guarantee
against the symmetric expected prot when both rms price-match

MN
NM
E πN
= E πN

E πM M .

Because all

expected prot functions are smooth, we can follow the approach of Chen, Narasimhan,
and Zhang (2001) by numerically comparing the dierence between
well as the dierence between
in this case, parameter space

MN
E πN

and

µ × θS to

E πM M

E πN N

and

MN
E πM

as

over the range of relevant parameters

derive all possible equilibria of the complete game.
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Table 2.1:

Stage-One Prot Comparison

Match

Don't Match

Match

E πM M , E πM M

MN
MN
E πM
, E πN

Don't Match

NM
NM
E πN
, E πM

E πN N , E πN N

As should be expected from Figure 2.1, the expressions for the expected prots of rms
in equilibria where only one rm oers a price-matching guarantee vary depending on
whether non-shoppers are indierent regarding which rm to sample rst (as in Proposition 5) or all prefer to sample the non-matching rm rst (as in Proposition 7). Suppose
that, only rm 1 announces a price-matching guarantee. The expected prots of rm 1 in
these two cases are respectively,

MN
E πM
=

2 (1 − µ) (1 − βN ) [µ + (1 − µ) βN ] p̄M N
,
2 (1 − µ) (1 − βN ) + µ (1 + θS )
e
MN
E πM

where the superscript

e)
M N (M N

(2.8)

2µ (1 − µ) p̄M N
=
2 − µ (1 − θS )

e
(2.9)

refers to equilibria where non-shoppers are indier-

ent regarding which rm to sample rst (prefer to sample the non-matching rm rst).
In contrast, the symmetric expected prot when neither rm price-matches is

(1 − µ) p̄N N /2.
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E πN N =

MN
Figure 2.3: E πN N − E πM

over

Figure 2.3 maps the dierence between
parameter space

µ × θS .

µ × θS ⊂ (0, 1) × (0, 1)

E πN N

and

MN
E πM

(or

MN
E πM

From the gure, it can be observed that

appropriate) is always greater than

E πN N

in the interior of

c = 1).

(assuming

e

as appropriate) over

MN
E πM

µ × θS :

(or

MN
E πM

e

as

that is, the price-

matching rm never wants to deviate to not matching when its rival does not match (or
conversely, the situation where neither rm matches is not an equilibrium of the complete
game). Moreover, as the gure makes evident, the dierence in prot grows in the proportion of shoppers who invoke price-matching guarantees. The one exception to

E πN N

occurs when

θS = 1.

MN
MN
E πM
, E πM
>

In this case, even though a rm may oer a price-matching

guarantee, consumers do not invoke it, and as a result, consumer search and rm pricing
are precisely the same as if price-matching were not an option.
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e

1
0.8

ΘS

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Μ

Figure 2.4: µ × θS ⊂ (0, 1) × (0, 1):
(b)

Eπ

MM

−

MN
E πN
or

Eπ

MM

−

(a) Shaded Region Implies
e
MN
E πN (assuming c = 1).

MN
E πN
− E πM M ≥ 0

;

Like Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4(a), which compares the expected prot of the non-matching
rm when only one rm oers a price-matching guarantee with the symmetric expected
prot when both rms price-match, shows that price-matching is usuallythough not
alwaysa best response to a competitor's price-matching announcement. The non-matching
rm analogues of Equations (2.8) and (2.9) are respectively,
and

MN
= (1 − µ) p̄M N .
E πN
e

e

MN
= 2 (1 − µ) (1 − βN ) p̄M N
E πN

Comparing these to the symmetric expected prot when both

rms price-match,

E πM M =



1−µ
1 + µθS

2θS
 1+θ

S

(1 + µθS )p̄M M
,
2

we observe that with the exception of a small region in which both
1,

E πM M

is greater than

MN
E πN

(or

MN
E πN

e

as appropriate) over

(2.10)

µ

and

µ × θS .
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θS

are close to

In particular,

with regard to equilibria where non-shoppers prefer to sample the non-matchingand in

25 Smoothness of the prot functions thereby implies a subset of parameter values over which one rm
strictly prefers to price-match while the other rm is indierent between oering and not oering pricematching guarantees. The subset is a curve that partitions
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µ × θS .

that case, lower expected pricerm, Figure 2.4(a) tells us that because for most

MN
θS , E π M M > E πN
,
e

µ

and

announcing a price-matching guarantee is generally a protable al-

ternative to being a non-matching, low price competitor to a price-matching rm. Figure
2.4(b), which maps the actual prot dierence compared in Figure 2.4(a), shows that the
dierence is decreasing in

θS .

When

θS

grows, fewer shoppers invoke price-matching guar-

antees, narrowing the distinction between oering and not oering these guarantees.
26

The following result summarizes the discussion above.

Market Equilibrium. Suppose that shoppers sample prices at random and θS ∈ (0, 1).
In the equilibrium of the complete game, either both rms will oer price-matching guarantees or only one rm will oer a price-matching guarantee on the equilibrium path. In any
equilibrium outcome where rms are given the option of oering price-matching guarantees, rm prots and expected prices are higher than when price-matching is not an option.

2.6 Asymmetric Equilibria (Numerical Analysis)
Although equilibria where
because

βS

and

βN

βS = 1/2

are intuitively appealing and mathematically tractable,

are endogenously determined, equilibria where

βS 6= 1/2

also exist,

even if both rms announce an intent to price-match on the equilibrium path. Although a
complete investigation of such equilibria would be quite lengthy, they warrant some discussion, particularly when only a single rm announces an intent to price-match. To simplify
the exposition, we restrict the discussion to equilibria where non-shoppers are indierent
regarding which rm to sample rst.

26 The nal sentence in the result below relies on the comparison of
Corollary 1.
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E πN N

and

MN
E πM

along with

1
0.9

ΒN

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

ΒS

Figure 2.5:

µ = θS = 0.5:
c = 1).

Both Firms Match and

(b) Equilibrium Prots (assuming

Mathematically, multiple

βS

and

βN

(a) Equilibrium

βS > 0.5

and

βN > 0.5;

pairs may prevail for any combination of the exoge-

nous parameters because in each equilibrium involving subgames played after at least one
rm reveals an intent to price-match, the solution for

βS

and

βN

is obtained using the sin-

gle equation that sets the expected prices in the two rms equal to each other, making all
consumers indierent between which rm to search rst. For instance, in the subgame
where both rms oer price-matching guarantees, Figure 2.5(a) shows the set of all equilibrium

βS > 1/2

and

βN > 1/2

in the case that

µ = θS = 1/2

sents the expected prots of rms 1 and 2 for combinations of

while Figure 2.5(b) repre-

βS

and

βN

in Figure 2.5(a).

From 1.5(b), we can observe that as the equilibrium becomes more asymmetric from the
standpoint that the absolute value dierence between

βN

and

1 − βN

increases, so do the

prots of the two rms. Table 2.2 presents additional evidence of prots rising with the
amount of asymmetry in the subgame where both rms oer price-matching guarantees for
various combinations of

µ

and

θS .

In particular, for each combination of

rms' expected prots are higher when

βN = 0.55
35

(and

βS

µ

and

θS ,

both

is endogenously determined

βN = 0.5,

accordingly) than when

assuming an equilibrium where non-shoppers are in-

dierent regarding which rm to sample rst exists when

βN = 0.6

prots are higher when

Table 2.2:

than when

βN = 0.55.

βN = 0.55.

Likewise, expected
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Firm Prots When Both Firms Match

µ

θS

βN = 0.50
π1 = π2

.20

.20

10.75

10.79

11.75

N/A

N/A

.50

.20

3.12

3.15

3.37

3.18

3.62

3.24

.80

.20

1.06

1.09

1.13

1.11

1.20

1.23

1.71

.20

.50

4.27

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4.29

4.59

.50

.50

1.19

1.20

1.29

1.22

1.38

1.23

1.46

.80

.50

0.35

0.36

0.38

0.37

0.40

0.42

0.57

.20

.80

2.65

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2.66

2.73

.50

.80

0.71

0.72

0.77

N/A

N/A

0.72

0.77

.80

.80

0.19

0.19

0.20

0.20

0.22

0.21

0.23

a

µ

βN = 0.60
π1
π2

consumers have no cost of search (shoppers), while

c=1
and

βN = 0.55
π1
π2

a, b

(non-shoppers).

βN

θS

βS = 0.999
π1
π2
10.80
c

1−µ

12.03
4.32
c

have search cost

shoppers always ignore price-matching guarantees.

βS

respectively represent the fraction of shoppers and non-shoppers who

begin search at rm 1. Non-shoppers' valuation for the good is assumed to be
strictly higher than their equilibrium reservation price.
b

Equilibrium

βS

varies with

µ

and

θS

for a given value of

βN

and vice versa.

N/A implies that an equilibrium where non-shoppers are indierent regarding
which rm to sample rst does not exist for the given value of
column gives results for

βS = 0.999

βN .

Rightmost

to approximate prots with highest level of

asymmetry.
c

No equilibrium with

βS = 0.999.

Results given are for

βN = 0.999

and

βS = 0.80.
27 Moreover, as might be expected from Proposition 3, Table 2.2 suggests that expected prots decrease
in

µ

and

θS

for each realization of

βN .
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When

βN , βS > 1/2,

as can be inferred from Equation (2.3), rm 1 will capture a higher

proportion of non-shoppers while rm 2 expects to capture more shoppers. Firm 1 sets
higher prices and has fewer sales than in the symmetric case because when it serves a
higher proportion of non-shoppers, it loses more prot from these captive consumers whenever it lowers its price. Even though rm 2 has fewer non-shoppers than in the symmetric
case, it will tend to have higher prices as well because it no longer needs to lower prices as
much to have the same probability of capturing the bulk of the shoppers as it did in the
symmetric case. Thus, both rms have higher prices and expected prots than in the symmetric case.
Intuitively, an asymmetric equilibrium may result in the presence of price-matching because more shoppers may prefer to purchase at a particular rm (and so rst sample the
price of its rival), but are lexicographic, valuing a purchase at a lower price over a purchase at a preferred rm. Price-matching will allow some shoppers to purchase at a preferred rm at the lower price even when that rm does not list the lower price. For instance, if rm 2 ends up setting the higher price ex-post,
less purchase there. The higher

βS ,

µβS (1 − θS )

shoppers neverthe-

the greater the number of shoppers that end up mak-

ing a purchase at rm 2. Ex-ante, given

µ

and

θS ,

rms set prices to make non-shoppers

indierent between which rm to sample. A higher

βS

entails a higher

βN

in order that

Equation (2.4) may hold.
Table 2.3, which corresponds to Table 2.2 for a subgame with a single matching rm, also
suggests that expected prots are increasing in the absolute value dierence between
and

1 − βN

when

βN

for both the matching and non-matching rm. In Section 2.5 we learned that

βS = 1/2,

price-matching (whether by one rm or both) always led to higher rm

prots and prices relative to a regime where price-matching is forbidden. Tables 2.2 and
2.3 suggest that asymmetry in the search behavior of consumers will exacerbate these effects. Moreover, because we know that shoppers always obtain the lowest price in equilib-
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rium whereas non-shoppers never invoke price-matching guarantees, rm prot increases
must come at the expense of consumer welfare.

Table 2.3:

a

a, b

βN = 0.55(0.45)

βN = 0.60(0.40)

βS = 0.999(0.001)

µ

θS

π1 (π2 )

π2 (π1 )

π1 (π2 )

π2 (π1 )

π1 (π2 )

π2 (π1 )

.20

.20

5.78

6.29

N/A

N/A

10.75

11.99

.50

.20

0.71

0.76

0.94

1.07

3.23

4.30

.80

.20

0.16

0.16

0.18

0.19

0.45

.20

.50

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4.29

4.58

.50

.50

0.71

0.76

0.94

1.07

1.23

1.46

.80

.50

0.16

0.16

0.18

0.19

0.42

0.57

.20

.80

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2.66

2.73

.50

.80

0.71

0.76

N/A

N/A

0.72

0.77

.80

.80

0.16

0.16

0.18

0.19

0.21

0.23

µ

consumers have no cost of search (shoppers), while

c=1
and

Firm Prots When Only Firm 2 (Firm 1) Matches

(non-shoppers).

βN

θS

1−µ

c

0.63

c

have search cost

shoppers always ignore price-matching guarantees.

βS

respectively represent the fraction of shoppers and non-shoppers who

begin search at rm 1. Non-shoppers' valuation for the good is assumed to be
strictly higher than their equilibrium reservation price.
b

Equilibrium

βS

varies with

µ

and

θS

for a given value of

βN

and vice versa.

N/A implies that an equilibrium where non-shoppers are indierent regarding
which rm to sample rst does not exist for the given value of
column gives results for

βS = 0.999 (βS = 0.001)
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βN .

Rightmost

to approximate prots with

highest level of asymmetry.
c

No equilibrium with

0.999 (βN = 0.001)

and

βS = 0.999 (βS = 0.001).

Results given are for

βN =

βS = 0.657 (βS = 0.343).

From Section 2.4, we know that when

βS = 1/2,

beliefs regarding

o the equilibrium path because whereas the unique value of

βN

is

βN

must vary on and

1/2

when either both,

or neither rm announces an intent to price-match, as seen in Figure 2.2(a), it turns out
that

βN 6= 1/2

when one rm oers a price-matching guarantee while the other does not.

In a subgame where both rms price-match, consumers cannot make any inference about
rm pricing behavior ahead of the search process, so that randomization regarding the rst
sample seems to be the most reasonable approach. This is not necessarily the case after
consumers have observed rms making opposite matching decisions. Thus, it seems sensible to think that beliefs regarding

βN

might be more symmetric in an equilibrium where

both rms match relative to one where only one does so. An insightful comparison then
arises if we juxtapose the expected prots in the leftmost prot column in Table 2.2 with
the rightmost column in Table 2.3, the former representative of (symmetric) randomization
when both rms match and the latter approximating the highest level of asymmetry that
might arise when only one rm matches. Among the
observe that only in the case of

µ = 0.80

and

(µ, θS )

θS = 0.20,

pairs in the two tables, we

is expected prot higher when

both rms oer price-matching guarantees. As such, within the context of this model,
there are two ways to interpret the real world observation that only a fraction of the rms
producing the same good tend to oer price-matching guarantees: (i) most consumers are
shoppers who do not invoke price-matching guarantees
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or (ii) rms that choose not to

price-match believe that a more symmetric (and potentially less protable) equilibrium
might prevail were they to oer price-matching guarantees.

28 This interpretation proceeds from Figure 2.4(a), which shows that when
both rms oer price-matching guarantees in equilibrium unless
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µ

and

θS

βS = 1/2

in all subgames,

are both very high.

2.7 Conclusion
This article explores the eects that price-matching guarantees have on rms and consumers when consumers optimally search for price after learning rms' price-matching
policies. Price-matching guarantees alter the shopping behavior of both types of consumers
in our model in a way that encourages rms to raise prices. When consumers who have no
cost of price search invoke price-matching guarantees at rms that list higher prices, rms
are discouraged from lowering prices in order to attract such consumers. Understanding
this price-increasing eect, consumers who face an opportunity cost of searching for price
accept higher prices at already sampled rms because they anticipate that further search
is less likely to yield a lower price. In addition, because consumers with no search costs
may be able to obtain the lower price at either rm, there is a multiplicity of asymmetric
equilibria where more asymmetry leads to higher expected prices and rm prots.
While the underlying mechanism driving the eects of price-matching in our model is new,
this article is not orthogonal to the previous literature. The eect that price-matching has
on consumer search leads to both welfare diminishing tacit collusion and price discrimination. Tacit collusion occurs because rms understand that a rival's threat to match a
lower price entails a smaller benet from any incremental price cut. This threat increases
the greater the percentage of consumers who have observed both prices that invokes pricematching guarantees. Price discrimination occurs because consumers who have no cost of
price search may use a price-match to secure a lower price from the rm listing the higher
price while the rm's remaining customers pay the higher listed price. However, contrary
to the result in signaling models of price-match, where ex-ante asymmetries persist expost, we nd that price-matching alone is enough to generate an asymmetric equilibrium.
In the model presented, asymmetries increase rm prots at the expense of consumer welfare, but it would be interesting to see how dierences in rm production costs or brand-
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ing inuence search behavior when price-matching guarantees are in place. This is not immediately obvious from the above analysis. Ex-ante asymmetries have the potential to reduce asymmetries ex-post, but it is unclear if this is a good thing because it may entail
29

more purchases from the higher cost rm.

This study has implications for future empirical work. Recent empirical literature has
focused primarily on comparisons of price observations between rms with and without
price-matching guarantees and arrived at opposite results (Moorthy and Winter 2006; Arbatskaya, Hviid, Shaer 2006). The results in this article suggest that such cross-sectional
ndings point purely to underlying cost or other dierences between rms without telling
us the overall welfare eect of adopting a matching policy. Under most combinations of
parameters, the expected prices among otherwise homogeneous rms that dier in the
adoption of a price-matching guarantee remain the same in our model. This suggests that
what is really necessary is a welfare comparison of rms over timebefore any have adopted
price-matching policies, and after some or all have (see Hess and Gerstner 1991); although
even this may not be foolproof, as the adoption of a matching policy may follow a change
in production costs.
A survey test of our model could ask individuals who use price-matching guarantees to secure the lowest price if they would obtain that price regardless by purchasing somewhere
else. An armative answer would validate the model by telling us that price-matching
guarantees can keep consumers out of rms with lower listed prices.

29 In an experimental study, Biswas et al. (2002) nd that when consumers have preconceived notions
of a store's price image, low-price guarantees may lead to heightened (lowered) intentions to sample the
prices of other stores when the price image is high (low). In another, Mago and Pate (2009) show that
increases in market prices brought about by price-matching guarantees are curtailed by rms' cost asymmetries.
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Chapter 3

Preference Complexity and
Multidimensional Competition

3.1 Introduction
Economists have studied the eects of product complexity on market structure for some
time. There is a wide variety of papers that explore the consequences of complexity on
such topics as international trade, innovation, and rm organization. However, all of these
models treat complexity as an artifact of the good's creation; more complex goods are
those which are more dicult or complicated to produce. In other words, economists have
considered complexity solely from the point of view of the producer. In this paper I investigate another form of complexity which stems from the variation in consumers' preferences over the god. From this perspective, some goods, like forks, are simple. What
consumers want from them is straightforward and there are not many dierent ways to
achieve that goal. Preferences over other goods, like automobiles, are complex because
consumers want many things from them which can be delivered in a variety of distinct
ways.
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To distinguish technical complexity from Preference complexity, consider food products.
Typically, food products are technically simple, but preference-complex. There is a great
variety of characteristics that consumers care about in their food including the taste, health
value, presentation, and ethical consequences of the production of their food, and each of
these properties can be broken down into numerous sub categories. Health value, for instance, can be divided into fat content, cholesterol content, sodium content, as well as the
presence of a variety of allergens. All of these characteristics apply to a good as technically simple as bread, which has been produced for thousands of years. For the rest of the
paper, assume that complexity refers to preference complexity unless otherwise noted.
Consider the markets for milk and cheese. Whereas these goods are overall similar, there
are many, many more individual varieties of cheese for sale than varieties of milk. A similar observation can be made about the markets for our and bread. I argue that the most
salient inherent dierence in the markets for milk and cheese is the fact that cheese is
much more complex. In this paper I make the case that more complex goods generate a
greater variety of products in equilibrium. While it seems immediate to claim that more
potential products should lead to more actual products, there's no guarantee that the demand will exist for all of the individual varieties. In section 4 I provide evidence that increasing the complexity of a good raises the price of all of the products in the market, allowing more to coexist in equilibrium.
To get this result, I embed a characteristic space (Lancaster 1966) inside a model of spatial competition. This creates a hypercube over which a number of rms compete, similar
to the framework used by Irmen and Thisse (Irmen and Thisse 1998). Then the complexity of the product space can be represented by the number of dimensions of the hypercube.
While Irmen and Thisse nd that the number of dimensions in their model is largely irrelevant, this is a direct result of only studying a duopoly. I allow many rms to operate
simultaneously and compare the nature of their competition as I vary the dimension of the
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space. Because this model is the rst to study the decisions of more than two rms competing over more than one dimension, I initially restrict attention to an exogenous location
pricing game.
I nd that the behavior of the model is markedly dierent from standard Hotelling models.
Neither the principle of minimum dierentiation (Hotelling 1929) or principle of maximum
dierentiation from (d'Aspremonte et. al. 1979) hold. In addition, I nd that rms' prices
decline directly in the number of their neighbors. I obtain these unusual results because
my model allows for interactions between a rm's competition with each of its neighbors.
In other multi-rm Hotelling models, such as the circular road (Salop 1979) or the hyperpyramid (Von Ungern-Sternberg 1991), consumers live only on the edges between rms, so
the results of competition have no direct eect on each other. Finally, when I relax the assumption of exogenous location on a square, I nd that the standard location choice game
for four rms does not have a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and provides
a brief example. The basic case of the model is solved in section 3. An alternate specication of the model, useful for interdimensional comparisons, is solved in Section 4. In
section 5, I depart from my previous work to study an endogeonus location model in 2 dimensions. Section 6 concludes.

3.2 The Model
The model I study is a variant of Hotelling's famous model. Hotelling conceived of the single axis of competition in his original model as location along a main street in a town.
Most recent uses of Hotellings model have reimagined the axis of competition as a measure of product dierentiation along a single characteristic. The model I study poses the
question of what happens when rms compete over many characteristics of a good simulta-
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neously and whether or not the number of individual characteristic is important.
There exists a good with n characteristics. As an example, consider pizza with its characteristics Thin crust vs. deep dish and greasy vs. non-greasy. Each of these can be normalized to a spectrum [0,1] and varied independently of each other. Then, every possible
type of pizza can be represented by a square. More generally, I look at an n-cube dened
by

Z = [0, 1]n .

sume that

2n

In order to exploit the high degree of inherent symmetry in a cube, I as-

symmetric rms compete on Z. Order the rms arbitrarily and label them

rm 1 through rm

2n .

To avoid confusion, a good refers to the total market, where a

product is a specic instance of the good given by a particular location vector.
There is a mass of consumers, normalized without loss to 1, distributed uniformly across
the interior of the hypercube, with their location giving the exact conguration of the
good that they most prefer. Consumers suer quadratic disutility from consuming a product that deviates from their ideal with a standard, Euclidean notion of distance. Each
agent purchases exactly one good from one of the rms. An agent located at x receives
indirect utility according to

ux (y, p)

from purchasing good y at price p.

ux (y, p) = −p − t

n
X

(xi − yi )2

i=1
Above, t denotes equivalently the size of the hypercube or the intensity of preferences,
while the summation is merely the square of the Euclidean distance from x to y. An agent
at x will prefer rm A to rm B if and only if
Let rm i be located at point

zi

ux (A, pA ) ≥ ux (B, pB ).

and charge price

pi .

Dene

p = (p1 , p2 , p3 ...)

as the vector

of prices. The set of consumers that purchase from rm i is given by the set of consumers
that individually prefer rm i to each other rm j. Dene

n
n
X
X
i
2
Si (p) := {y ∈ Z| pi + t
(zk − yk ) ≤ pj + t
(zkj − yk )2 ∀j }
k=1

k=1
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Then the demand of rm i,
not matter whether or not

Di (p)

Si

is the volume of this set, or

Di (p) = V (Si (p)).

It does

is dened through weak or strict preference, as the set of in-

dierent consumers has no volume as long as rms are distinct. I assume that any product
may be produced at the same constant marginal cost, which is normalized to zero without
loss of generality, so the rms' prot function is given by

πi (p) = pi Di (p).

Since all rms are ex-ante symmetric and competing in a symmetric environment, I wish
to restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. Towards that end, assume that rms position
themselves in a reectively symmetric arrangement.

Denition 1. An set of points A = {z i }2n is called

reectively symmetric

if ∀i,j ∃zk ∈A such

i
i
, ...zni ).
, 1 − zji , zj+1
that z k = (z1i , z2i ...zj−1

If a set of points is reectively symmetric, the position of all other points is uniquely de-

z1.
Qn

termined by the position of a single point. Call that point
set of points containing
possible vector

zk

z1

can be alternately dened by

such that

zik = zi1

or

zik = 1 − zi1 .

tively symmetric positioning can be characterized by
for some

a

and

b.

Any reectively symmetric

1
i=1 {zi , 1

− zi1 },

the set of every

For example, when n=2, every reec-

((a, b), (1−a, b), (1−a, 1−b), (a, 1−b))

Geometrically speaking, points in a reectively symmetric arrangement

form a hyperrectangle, invariant to reections over the coordinates.
Notice that
to create

2n

zi1 <

1
if and only if
2

1 − zii >

1
. Then if I bisect each coordinate of the cube
2

subcubes, exactly one point from each reectively symmetric set of points will

fall into each subcube. Relabel the point closest to the origin to be
Like every point in a reectively symmetric set,

z1

z1

such that

z1 ≤

1
.
2

will have n neighbors that dier from it

in only one coordinate. The distance between any two neighbors, or the side length of the
hyperrectangle that the set denes, will be

δj = 1 − 2zj1

for the relevant coordinate j.

For most of the paper, with the exception of section 5, I will assume an exogenous location. Firms are forced to locate in some reectively symmetric positioning which can be
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summarized by the representative member,

z1.

In the next section, I will solve a simple

example in this model to give the reader a clear notion of how the model works.

3.2.1

An Example

Take n=2, t=1. Four rms locate in a reectively symmetric manner on a square. Let
their positioning be dened by

z 1 = (0, 0),

so that rms position on the vertices of the

square. Due to symmetry, it suces to solve the problem of a single rm. Without loss
of generality, consider rm 1. It is safe to assume that all other rms are choosing a uniform price, p. The set of consumers indierent between rm 1 and rm 2, located at point

(1, 0),

is given by the equation (3.1), which simplies to (3.2).

p1 + (x1 − 0)2 + (x2 − 0)2 = p + (1 − x1 )2 + (x2 − 0)2
x1 =

Both

x1

and

x2

(3.1)

1 − p1 + p
2

must be weakly positive to lie in Z. To lie in

(3.2)

S1 (p),

a point

(x1 , x2 )

must

satisfy 3 constraints, one for each of rm 1's competitors. In the set of constraints that
dene

S1 (p)

below, the rst three are the constraints from rms located at (1,0), (0,1),

and (1,1) respectively.

1 − p1 + p
2
1 − p1 + p
x2 ≤
2
2 − p1 + p
x1 ≤
− x2
2
x1 ≤

x1 ≥ 0
x2 ≥ 0
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Figure 3.1:

Possible shapes of

S1 (p)

There are three possible congurations for

S1 − S4

presented by Figure 3.1. Represented

from left to right are the cases in which rm 1 charges a higher, equal, or lower price relative to the other three.
As you can see, the formula determining

If

If

p = p1 ,

dierentiable at

depends on whether or not

p1 < p.

(1 − p1 + p)2 (p − p1 )2
−
4
8
(1 − p1 + p)2
p1 ≥ p : D1 (p) =
4
p1 < p : D1 (p) =

Recall that rm 1's prot is given by
same when

V (S1 (p))

π1 (p) = pi Di (p).

Since the expressions are the

the prot function is certainly continuous, but it is possibly non-

p = p1 ,

which must hold in equilibrium. For now, assume that the func-

tion is dierentiable. In order to solve for

p1 ,

set it equal to zero, and then impose that

p = p1 .

I take the derivative of the prot function,

pressions for the right and left hand derivatives at

Although there may be dierent ex-

p = p1 ,

dierentiability assures us that

they are equivalent. I use the right hand derivative for our calculations since it is simpler.
Following this process, in a symmetric equilibrium
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p=

1
.
2

3.3 Price Equilibrium
Consider a product space with n characteristics. There are

2n

librium, all rms will charge the same price and capture the

rms. In a symmetric equi-

1 1 1
x x ... hypercube that con2 2 2

tains them.

Lemma 1. The prot function, πj (p) is everywhere dierentiable in p1 .
Proof.

See Appendix B.

I'd like to take a moment to discuss the general strategy of nding equilibria in this environment. Because I am interested in symmetric equilibria, I can assume that all rms are
choosing the same price and then consider the problem of a potential deviant. Without
loss, I can assume that the potential deviant is rm 1, located closest to the origin. Then,
I must nd rm 1's prot function in terms of the candidate price,

p1 .

p,

and his deviation,

Due to the dierentiability of the prot function, I always assume that the price of the

rm whose problem is being considered is greater than or equal to the price of other rms,
as this greatly simplies the expressions involved. Knowing the prot function, I can take
the rst order condition with respect to

p1 ,

then set

p = p1

and solve to nd the equilib-

rium price.
The only dicult part of this process is nding an expression for
is a region dened by the constraints

0 ≤ xi

D1 (p).

Recall that

for each i and also, for each j, (3.3).

n
n
X
X
1 2
p1 + t
(xk − zk ) ≤ pj + t
(xk − zkj )2
k=1

zkj

can take one of two forms: either

S1 (p)

(3.3)

k=1

zk1 ,

or

(1 − zk1 ).

Letting

Ij = {k ∈ |zk1 − zkj 6= 0},

simplify (3.3) to (3.4), and further to (3.5) with a change of variables.
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I can

0 ≤ pj − p 1 + t

X

0 ≤ pj − p1 + t

X

(1 − 2zj1 ) − 2(1 − 2zj1 )xj

(3.4)

δj − 2δj xj

(3.5)

i∈Ij

i∈Ij

In order to nd the volume of

S1 (p)

I must to nd out which of those constraints are re-

dundant and which bind. Dene a type j constraint to be a constraint imposed by a rm k
such that

|Ik | = j .

which dier from

Geometrically speaking, type j constraints are imposed by type j rms,

z1

in j coordinates.

Lemma 2. In equilibrium, only type one constraints bind.
Proof.

See Appendix B.

This means that rms only compete directly with their neighbors in equilibrium, so the
region that a rm captures is just a hyperrectangle. Thus, for

p1 ≥ p,

the prot of rm 1

is given by equation (3.6).

n
Y
δi t + p − p 1
)
π1 (p) = p1 (
2δi t
i=1
For a set of number, A, let

hm(A)

(3.6)

be the harmonic mean of A.

Theorem 1. If 2n rms locate in a reectively symmetric positioning on an n-cube and
compete in prices, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which rms charge p∗ =
t hm({δi }n
i=1 )
n

Proof.

and earn prots equal to π∗ =

t hm({δi }n
i=1 )
2n n

.

See Appendix B.

In general, both prices and prots decrease with dimension. Prots obviously decline in
n, since the same volume must be split among more and more rms. In an n-cube, each
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rm has n neighbors with which it competes directly. More neighbors lead to a decrease
in prices because the measure of consumers that a rm captures from one of its neighbors
interacts positively with the measure of consumers that it captures from each of its other
neighbors. This gives rms a strong incentive to cut prices to expand their market share,
leading to more savage competition and a lower equilibrium price. This eect scales with
each additional direct competitor.
A cursory examination of other multi-rm Hotelling models such as the circular road or
Von Ungern-Sternberg's pyramid shows that the number of rms has no impact on pricing behavior as long as the distance between any two rms is preserved. In those models,
in which consumers only live on one dimensional edges between rms, rms compete independently with each of their neighbors. More rms are either irrelevant, as in Salop, or
enter the prot function as a linear multiplier, as in Von Ungern-Sternberg.
Note that both prices and prots increase in each

δj ,

the distance between neighbors. As

is common in Hotelling models, rms can charge higher prices whenever they are located
further apart. The

δj 's

cannot be greater than 1, so the reectively symmetric arrange-

ment that maximizes rm prots is given by
this positioning of rms the

z1 = 0,

basic positioning.

or a rm located on each vertex. Call

At rst glance, the basic positioning appears

to follow the principle of maximal dierentiation, as it represents the arrangement of

2n

rms on an n-cube that maximizes the distance between rms. However, the principle
of maximal dierentiation is a statement about equilibrium behavior in a location choice
game and, thus far, I have only worked with an exogenous location game.

3.4 Osets
In this section I will introduce an alternate positioning so that I can partially divorce the
number of dimensions from the number of rms. I show, using this alternate positioning,
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that there exists an arrangement of

2n

rms on an m-cube such that each rm earns more

prots than any rm in any reectively symmetric positioning of
whenever

m > n.

2n

rms on an n-cube

While increasing the dimensions of the hypercube generally exposes each

rm to more axes of competition which drive prices down, it also allows rms to locate
further from one another, driving prices up. Given the results of this section, the latter
eect dominates.
Consider a collection of m rms on an n-cube in some symmetric positioning, A. In a symmetric equilibrium, each rm will earn the same prot, and that prot will be determined
by m, n, and the location of the rms. Let the function

π̃(m, n, A)

give such prots.

Proposition 1. There exists an arrangement of rms B such that π̃(m, n + 1, B)
≥ π̃(m, n, A).

Proof.

To get the result, simply replicate the positioning given by A on one of the n di-

mensional sides of the (n+1)-cube. The regions captured by the rms will be the same as
on the n-cube, but prismed with length 1. Then, rms will face the same prot functions,
make the same decisions and earn the same prot.

With this proposition, I need only show that

2n

rms can be made to be strictly better

o in an (n+1)-cube than they can be in an n-cube. Recall that the basic positioning will
generate the most prot of any reectively symmetric arrangement. In the basic positioning,

δi = 1

for every i, and so the prot of each rm is given by

to construct a positioning of

2n

t
. Therefore, it suces
n2n

rms on an (n+1)-cube that dominates the basic position-

ing on an n-cube.

√
The positioning I would like to examine is such that there is a distance of at least

2

be-

tween any two rms, or that no rms are neighbors in the sense of the previous section. In
order to do this, position a rm at every vertex
ger k. It is easy to verify that this takes exactly
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zi

such that

2n

< z i , z i >= 2k

for some inte-

rms in an (n+1)-cube. To verify that

Figure 3.2:

The oset positioning on a 3 cube

there are no adjacent rms, note that it's a collection of type 2 k rms for some k. Obviously a type 2 rm cannot be adjacent to a type 4 rm. If two type 2 rms are distinct,
one of them must have a zero where the other has a 1 and, to compensate, must have a 1
somewhere that the other has a zero. Therefore, we have a positioning of exactly
such that no two rms are adjacent. Refer to this arrangement as the

2n

rms

oset positioning.

Figure 3.2 shows the oset positioning in three dimensions, with the black dots representing the location of rms.
Once again, I can appeal to symmetry and consider only the problem of rm 1, located at
the origin, and assume that all other rms charge a uniform price. Suppose that rm 1's
price,

p1

is at least as large as the competitors price,

p.

When

p1 ≥ p

in the basic case last

section, only type 1 constraints bound. Here, there are no type 1 constraints, and so only
type 2 constraints bind. The argument for this is extremely similar to Proposition 2 from
the last section and is omitted. Type 2 constraints are of the form
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xi ≤

2t − p1 + p
− xj
2t

Because every type 2 vertex is occupied, there is a constraint of this form for every i,j.

Theorem 2. There exists a symmetric arrangement of 2n rms on an (n+1) cube such
that each rm earns more prot in equilibrium than it is possible for any rm to earn in a
reectively symmetric equilibrium of 2n rms on an n-cube.
Proof.

See Appendix B.

Theorem 2 allows me to compare two markets that dier only in their Preference complexity. Suppose that there are n characteristics of good A and some m

>

n characteristics of

good B. If the markets have the same number of consumers and the same number of rms
competing, theorem 2 says that each rm in the market for good B ought to make more
prot. Suppose, instead, that there is a uniform xed cost, F, of entering either market A
or market B. Then, each rm must earn a prot of at least F in equilibrium in order to
survive. Since rms in market B earn more than those in market A, if entry is allowed,
there should be more rms in market B than in market A.
Here, I should clarify what is meant by a rm in this model. Each rm is located at a single bundle of characteristics, which means that they sell a product. What the model actually suggests is that the more complicated a product space is, the more individual products should be observed in equilibrium. This claim can be conrmed by a variety of observations like the milk/cheese comparison that was made in the introduction. While it is
intuitive to claim that the more kinds of products that are possible, the more should exist,
Theorem 2 provides concrete theoretical grounding for why this should be true even in the
case of xed demand for the overall good.

54

3.5 Endogenous Location
While the dominance of the oset positioning over the basic positioning is indicative that
rms ought to be better o in higher dimensions, it is not a concrete proof. Firms can position themselves to make higher prots in higher dimensions but it remains to be seen if
they would. Suppose that

2n

rms can choose both their price and their location on an n-

cube and on an (n+1)-cube. The natural question is which of the two set ups will yield a
higher prot for rms. Unfortunately, as I will show in this section, the question is generally unanswerable. There is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for four rms on a
square, and no reason to believe that there is such an equilibrium in higher dimensions.
To show that there is no pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, let Z be the square

[0, 1]x[0, 1]

and x t=1. As before, a mass 1 of consumers are uniformly distributed on Z. The utility
of a consumer located at x and purchasing a product from rm located at y that charges
price p is given by

ux (y, p) = −d(x, y)2 − p,

where d is the Euclidean distance. Each con-

sumer will maximize their utility by purchasing one unit of the good from the rm which
gives them the least disutility.
There are four rms, labeled rm 1 through rm 4. Each rm may choose its location in
Z,

zi = (ai , bi ),

and its price,

pi ∈ R+ .

In the xed location case, symmetry simply meant

that all rms charged the same price. With endogenous location, I need to extend symmetry to location decisions as well. There are two basic ways for four points to exhibit
symmetry on a square. They may be rotationally symmetric, invariant to a rotation of the
square, or reectively symmetric, invariant to reections of the square. Given a location
(a,b), there exists a unique rotationally symmetric positioning for the other three rms,
given by

h(a, b) = ((a, b), (1 − b, a), (1 − a, 1 − b), (b, 1 − a)).

g(a, b) = ((a, b), (1 − a, b), (1 − a, 1 − b), (a, 1 − b))

Similarly, for a given (a,b),

provides the unique reectively symmet-

ric positioning. Given the symmetry of the square, I can assume without loss of generality
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that

a ∈ [0, 12 ], and b ∈ [0, a].

As in the xed location model, dene

Ti

and

πie

such that

Ti (z, p) := {y ∈ Z| pi + d(y, z i ) ≤ pj + d(y, z j ) ∀j }
πie (z, p) := pi V (Ti (z, p))

In this model, a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium is dened as follows.

Denition 2. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is a vector of prices, (p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 ), a vector
of locations (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) and a map F : [0, 1]2 → {1, 2, 3, 4} such that:
1. (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) = g(z 1 ) or (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) = h(z 1 ).
2. F(x)=i if ∀j , pi + td(x, z i )2 < pj + td(x, z j )2 and only if ∀j , pi + td(x, z i )2 ≤ pj +
td(x, z j )2 .

3. Ti = {y ∈ Z|F (y) = i}.
4. For each i, pi maximizes pi V (Ti ).
5. pi = pj ∀i,j .
At rst, consider only rotationally symmetric equilibria. Any candidate equilibrium can
be summarized by the actions of one rm, since prices are uniform and the location can be
fed through

h(.).

To check if any candidate equilibrium is actually an equilibrium, I must

nd the prot function of a potential deviant in terms of his deviation and the actions of
his competitors according to the candidate. Let the potential equilibrium be (a,b,p) and
the deviation be

(â, b̂, p̂).

If a potential deviant, rm 1 for simplicity, maximizes his prot

at (a,b,p), then (a,b,p) is an equilibrium. In the case of a symmetric allocation, each rm
charges the same price and is located symmetrically about the square, inducing them to
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when l1,3 does not bind, (b)

T1

when l1,3 binds

split the consumers evenly. Then the prot from any symmetric allocation summarized by
(a,b,p) will simply be

T1

p
.
4

is made up of three constraints, one for each of the deviant's competitors. The sets be-

low are the consumers that prefer rm 1 to rms 2, 3, and 4 respectively.

{(x, y) ∈ Z|x ≤
{(x, y) ∈ Z|y ≤
{(x, y) ∈ Z|y ≤

1 + a2 − â2 − 2b + b2 − b̂2 + p − p̂ − 2ay + 2b̂y
}
2(1 − â − b)
2 + a2 − â2 − 2b + b2 − b̂2 + p − p̂ − 2a(1 − x) − 2x(1 − â)
2(1 − b − b̂)
1 + a2 − â2 − 2a + b2 − b̂2 + p − p̂ − 2âx + 2bx
2(1 − a − b̂)

}

(3.7)

}

(3.8)

(3.9)

Call the line of consumers that are indierent between purchasing from rm 1 and rm 2
(constraint (3.7), but holding with equality) l1,2 , and likewise for the other lines of indifference. Figure 3.3 shows the

[0, 1]x[0, 1]

square from the perspective of the rst rm: each

of the constraints represented by l1,j is plotted, bounding the region that rm 1 captures,

T1 .

Figure 3.3(a) shows the case in which l1,3 is non-binding, while Figure 3 (b) shows the

binding case.
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As indicated by the gure, dene the point
axis. Let the other variables,
1

gures .
ture 1,

V (T1 )

(α, 0)

(β, γ, δ, φ, ω, ρ, σ)

to be the intersection of l1,4 and the y-

be dened similarly in keeping with the

can be derived from basic geometry in each of the cases. In the case in pic-

,
π 1 = p̂V (T1 ) = p̂ αγ+βδ
2

while in picture 2,

π 2 = p̂V (T1 ) = p̂ αφ+ωρ−σφ+βσ
,
2

where the

superscripts refer to forms of the prot function rather than the prot function for dierent rms.
Clearly the crossover point from the rst expression to the second occurs when

φ = ρ.

Thus, the full prot function is given by the following:

e

π (a, b, p, â, b̂, p̂) =

Let a triple
if

(a∗ , b∗ , p∗ )

π e (a∗ , b∗ , p∗ , â, b̂, p̂)





p̂ αγ+βδ
2

if

ρ ≥ φ,


 p̂ αφ+ωρ−σφ+βσ
2

if

ρ < φ.

(3.10)

be said to be a local (global) maximum at itself with respect to

is maximized locally (globally) over

(â, b̂, p̂)

at

πe

(a∗ , b∗ , p∗ ).

Then, in this model, a rotationally symmetric pure strategy equilibrium will be a triple,

(a∗ , b∗ , p∗ )

that is a global maximum at itself with respect to

gating reectively symmetric equilibria is similar, but using
of the deviant's competitors rather than

h(.).

πe.

g(.)

The process for investito determine the location

All of the methodology remains the same in

the reective case.

Theorem 3. There is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of this game.
Proof.

To show that there are no pure strategy symmetric equilibria in this game, I must

show that there are no pure strategy reectively symmetric equilibria and also no pure
strategy rotationally symmetric equilibria. In appendix B, I formally prove that there are
no pure strategy rotationally symmetric equilibria. The proof for the reective case is similar.

1 Full expressions for

(α, β, γ, δ, ρ, σ, φ, ω)

as well as the full prot function and calculations are omitted

for clarity, but are available upon request.
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3.6 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper introduces a model of product dierentiation that considers the complexity
of a product from a consumer's perspective rather than a rm's. This is the rst model
to explicitly model preference complexity and investigate its eect on market structure.
My main result is that in an exogenous location setting, more individual products can be
supported in a more complex product space. In other words, the more potential kinds of
products that can exist in a market, the more products ought to exist in equilibrium. This
result meshes well with stylized facts from many markets. While it makes sense that products with more potential variance ought to support more realized variance, I provide clear
theoretical grounding for this idea.
Further, I nd that allowing rms to compete with each other over many axes of product
dierentiation radically alters the nature of competition. Unlike previous Hotelling models,
I nd that rms' pricing depends on the number of direct competitors because capturing
consumers from one rm has a positive eect on the measure captured from others. I also
nd a weak version of the principle of maximum dierentiation: that rms would be better
o locating as far from each other as possible, but that rms would not realize that allocation. Investigating a proper, endogenous location version of the model, I nd that there
need not be a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium for more than two rms in more than
one dimension. All of these results combine to call into question the practice of using one
dimensional Hotelling models to characterize competition between many rms in a potentially complex product space.
To extend my work further, I would like to do more with the endogenous location game. If
there is a way to perturb the game so that an equilibrium exists, I could investigate several interesting lines of research. Most immediately, I could address whether or not four
rms would be better o competing in two dimensions or one, to generate or negate a
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much more powerful version of the main result of this paper. I suspect that they would
be, as rms in any of the local equilibria of the game that I solved are, in fact, better o
in two dimensions. Further, I could investigate how the equilibrium changes in response
to changing travel costs, or if it's invariant. Lastly it would be interesting to compare rotationally and reectively symmetric equilibria, to see which is easier to achieve or more
protable.
To develop the contributions of my framework further, a natural next step is to examine
the eects of coalitions on the pricing behavior and prots of rms in a hypercube set up.
A coalition in this setting would represent either a merger between two rms or a single
rm selling multiple products. If individual rms behave in a qualitatively dierent way on
a hypercube than they do on a circular road, then it makes sense that coalitions would as
well. Additionally, unlike the circular road, a hypercube framework allows for large coalitions that treat every member rm symmetrically.
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Chapter 4

Grandfather Clauses and Consumer
Complacency

4.1 Introduction
A grandfather clause allows a certain group of people to be exempt from a wider change
in circumstances. They are mostly found in legislation, these days often included to reduce
opposition to the changes that a bill imposes from special interests. However, rms have
been known to use grandfather clauses to reward their loyal customers. In economics, this
practice typically takes the form of exempting existing subscribers of a service from a price
hike, or allowing them to keep consuming the service but no longer oering it to new customers. These practices, while hardly widespread, have been a feature of telecom markets
for decades. More recently, in May of 2014, the popular media streaming service Netix
oered a grandfather clause to all of its current customers shortly after announcing a general price hike. Despite this, there is no literature on either rms' motivations for oering
grandfather clauses, or their eects on welfare. This is likely the case because it is dicult
to imagine a world in which grandfather clauses make economic sense.
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When a rm raises its price for new customers only, it must be responding to a spike in
demand. Otherwise, it would not expect to attract any new customers, especially not at a
higher price. Even assuming a demand spike, there must be some other force which drives
rms to oer a grandfather clause instead of raising the price for everyone. Firms could
do so as a tool for price discriminating between long term and short term customers, but
there are a number of reasons that this is unlikely. Typically when price discriminating,
a rm will want to charge a higher price for customers that value its products more. In
this case, that means that rms would expect its preexisting customers to be less likely
to enjoy their product than a newcomer. Alternatively, if there is an intrinsic value to the
rm of having longstanding customers, such as word-of-mouth, then using longstanding
contracts would be a more sensible approach. Even supposing that a price discrimination
makes sense, a grandfather clause would generically be non-optimal. This is because the
optimal discount would have to precisely balance out the increase in price generated by
the demand shock.
In order for grandfather clauses to be optimal, there must be some qualitative dierence
between

keeping

a price and naming the same price two periods in a row. Consider two

competing rms that oer a subscription service, such as Netix and Amazon Prime. Since
these two services are constantly adding new shows and services, as well as losing them,
people's idiosyncratic tastes are changing each period. However, because their customers
are engaged in hundreds if not thousands of markets, they do not typically search to discover their preferences each time they change. It is a rare Netix subscriber that reconsiders whether or not they want to change services every month. However, consumers can be
induced to search if something draws their attention to the market. There are two changes
that can grab consumers' attention: 1) the price of their service increases, or 2) the nonidiosyncratic quality of the competition increases. In this way, when a rm develops an
average improvement to the quality of its service, it will induce its competitor's consumers
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to search. Ordinarily, a rm that has markedly improved its quality would also raise its
price. Here, however, they may wish to oer a grandfather clause in order to prevent their
consumers from searching and nding out that their idiosyncratic tastes have shifted far
enough such that they prefer the competition, despite the upswing in quality.

4.2 Model
4.2.1

A One Period Game

There are two rms that oer dierentiated but competing subscription services. There is
a mass one of consumers that have idiosyncratic tastes over these services. That is, each
consumer values consuming product
shock

i

i

at some average quality

µi

plus an iid preference

with mean zero. Each consumer also suers disutility equal to the price she paid,

or:

ui (pi ) = µi + i − pi

(4.1)

Then, a consumer will buy from rm 1 only if

µ1 + 1 − p1 ≥ µ2 + 2 − p2
Dene

 = 2 − 1

and let

 ∼ F (x).

sumers, let

F (x)

is equal to

F (µ1 − µ2 + p2 − p1 ).

(4.2)

To avoid having a positive measure of indierent con-

have no point masses. Then, the quantity of consumers that prefer rm 1

coverage, only the dierence,

Assuming that the

µ1 − µ2 ,

µi

are high enough to ensure market

has an impact on the model. Call this dierence

∆.

Lastly, assume that rms produce their services at a constant marginal cost, which can be
safely normalized to zero. Then, rm prot functions are given by
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π1 (p1 ; p2 , ∆) = p1 F (∆ + p2 − p1 )

(4.3)

π2 (p2 ; p1 , ∆) = p2 (1 − F (∆ + p2 − p1 ))

(4.4)

Then there will be an equilibrium whenever the rst order conditions are satised. For a
simple example, suppose that

 ∼ U [−a, a].

∆
3
∆
=a−
3
1
= (a +
2a
1
= (a −
2a
1
= (a +
2a
1
= (a −
2a

p1 = a +

(4.5)

p2

(4.6)

q1
q2
π1
π2

4.2.2

Then trivial calculations will show that

∆
)
3
∆
)
3
∆ 2
)
3
∆ 2
)
3

(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
(4.10)

A Two Period Game

For the two period game, let a superscript denote a time period, either 1 or 2. For this
section, bear in mind that consumer search decisions are exogenous. Suppose that initially
both rms have the same average quality so that

∆1 = 0.

In the rst period of the game,

both rms enter the market and set their prices. Then, consumers search each rm and
choose their favorite and the game plays out in the same manner as the previous subsection. Each month, the rms lose contracts and add content and generally change their particular product. Consumers tastes, then, migrate with new

's

being drawn. However, in

each of these periods, nothing draws consumers' attention to the market and they do not
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search. After the rst period, there are customers that would benet from switching services, but aren't paying enough attention to realize this.
After a long period of time has passed, consumers original preferences and hence the service that they subscribe to no longer carries any meaningful information about their current tastes. That is, their second period

's

are uncorrelated with the rst period's. Sup-

pose that in this second period rm 1 announces a general improvement in the quality of
its product, either through higher denition streaming, producing its own shows, or a particularly large addition of new content. Let the value of this improvement to the average
customer be called
suppose that

ν

ν.

Then, in the second period,

∆2 = ν .

For the purposes of this paper,

is exogenous and costless.

Because rm 1 has a very noticeable upswing in average quality and, presumably, advertised this, some of the customers from rm 2 will search both rms and possibly switch
to rm 1. If rm 1 does not change its price, its consumers from the previous period will
see no reason to search. Thus, rm 1 could attempt to hold onto its current customer base
while attracting new customers by not increasing its price. Alternatively, it could name
a higher price to reect its competitive edge, and count on its improved quality to keep
most, if not all, of its previous customers. Finally, it could try to get the best of both
worlds by maintaining its previous price for loyal customers so that they do not search,
while naming an optimal price for any newcomers. Obviously, the third option dominates
the rst, but in some cases the second may be best.
If the rm raises its price globally, all consumers will search. Then the situation is the
same as in the previous one period case, but using

∆ = ν

instead. If the rm oers a

grandfather clause, then its loyal customers are eectively out of the market and the rms
are competing only over the remaining mass

1
of consumers that search. Once again, this
2

competition will take the same form as in the single period model. Let superscripts denote the period and recall that

∆1 = 0.

Let

Π
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be the maximum prot a rm can achieve

by naming a single price, and

Πgf c

be the similar maximum if the rm uses a grandfather

clause. Putting this all together, rm 1 faces the choice between the following prots:

Πgf c = p11 q11 + q21 (p21 q12 )
=

(4.11)

ν
a 1 1
+ ( (a + )2 )
2 2 2a
3

(4.12)

Π = p21 q12
=

4.2.3

(4.13)

ν
1
(a + )2
2a
3

(4.14)

Equilibrium Behavior

Firm 1 will want to oer a grandfather clause when

Πgf c > Π,

which simplies to

√
ν < 3a( 2 − 1)

(4.15)

When the increase in quality is large enough to completely drive a competing rm out of
the market

ν ≥ 3a,

then a rm has no motivation at all to oer a grandfather clause.

There's no need to prevent its consumers from searching, since they'll stay with the rm
anyway. When the increase in quality is tiny, rms have a large incentive to try to prevent
their consumers from searching, since they can expect to lose approximately half of the
ones that do. Then, rms will want to oer grandfather clauses when their average quality
improvements are relatively small. This result does not depend on the unrealistic assumption that all of rm 2's customers search regardless of the size of rm 1's quality improvement. If there were some scaling function,

β(ν),

that determined the proportion of rm

2's customers that searched in terms of the size of rm 1's improvement, it would have no
eect on rm 1's incentives to oer a grandfather clause or not, it would only reduce the
overall protability of making the improvement in the rst place.
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4.2.4

Welfare

In this model, grandfather clauses are unambiguously bad for total welfare. This can be
seen without any explicit calculations, and applies beyond the simple example that I have
worked through thus far. First, since rm and consumer welfare are both linear in transfer
payments, money is a zero sum aair which can be discounted in total welfare calculations.
Then, the only thing that matters is the matching values for consumers to rms. Grandfather clauses act to distort these by preventing some of rm 1's customers from searching
and nding out that they would be better matched with rm 2. Furthermore, it is plain to
see that grandfather clauses are uniformly bad for rm 2 by eectively reducing the size of
its market. Grandfather clauses will be good for rm 1's welfare in the cases discussed in
the previous subsection.
The most interesting question is whether or not grandfather clauses are good for consumer
welfare. On the one hand, they reduce the average price paid by consumers. On the other
hand, they cause some consumers to be matched poorly and receive a service that they do
not enjoy very much. It bears asking then, is there a range of parameters in which rm 1
has an incentive to oer a grandfather clause that hurts consumers?
Returning to the simple, uniform example, the answer to this question can be calculated.
In a case without grandfather clauses, we know that the market will behave as outlined
in equations (4.5)-(4.10). Then, using equation (4.1), the total consumer welfare in such a
world is given by

Z

ν
3

ν 1
(µ + ν − (a + )) dx +
W =
3 2a
−a

a

Z
ν
3

ν 1
(µ + x − (a − )) dx
3 2a

(4.16)

where the rst integral is for rm 1's consumers and the second is for rm 2's. This expression simplies to
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W =µ−a+

a ν
ν2
+ +
4 2 36a

(4.17)

Now, in the case with a grandfather clause, half of the market is content to remain with
rm 1, paying a price of a, while the other half of the market behaves exactly as above.
Then,

1
1
W gf c = (µ + ν − a) + W
2
2
Clearly,
When

ν

W gf c > W

if and only if

µ + ν − a > W,

is suciently small relative to

a,

(4.18)

which occurs when

√
ν > 3a(3 − 2 2).

the price savings (proportional to

ν)

are small

a). Recall that rm 1 will
√
ν < 3a( 2 − 1). In this range, there are some

relative to the forgone gains through search (proportional to
only wish to oer a grandfather clause when

ν 's

where a grandfather clause is detrimental to consumer welfare, and others in which it

would enhance consumer welfare.

4.2.5

Investment

Hitherto, I have treated rm 1's improvement in overall quality,

ν

as exogenous. However,

it is more realistic to suppose that rm 1 is able to invest in some research and development process in order to determine the magnitude of

ν.

Then, the natural question to in-

vestigae is whether a rm's ability to oer a grandfather clause would encourage or discourage investment.
Suppose that there exists a convex, increasing, and dierentiable function

c(ν)

the investment cost required to improve the average quality of the product by
the rm will choose

ν

such that

∂π
∂ν

=

∂c
. Let
∂ν

ν GF C
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ν.

Then,

be the optimal level of improvement

when the rm institutes a grandfather clause, and let
when a rm does not oer a grandfather clause.

that gives

ν∗

be the optimal level of investment

Recall from equation (4.11) that in the case of a grandfather clause, the rm's prots are
given by

p11 q11 + q21 (p21 q12 ).

vides the prots as

∂ΠGF C
∂ν

= q21 ∂Π
.
∂ν

p21 q12 .

Since

In the case without grandfather clauses, equation (4.13) proSince the rst period quantities do not depend on

q21 < 1

and

c(ν)

is convex, then

ν

in any way,

ν GF C < ν ∗ .

So far in this section, the rm's actual decision to oer a grandfather clause has been treated
exogenously for clarity of exposition. Recall that, generally speaking, there exists some

ν̂

such that a rm will want to oer a grandfather clause if and only if

ν ∗ ≥ ν̂ ,

ν < ν̂ .

Then, if

the option to oer a grandfather clause will have no eect on the equilibrium level

of investment. However, if

ν ∗ < ν̂

then the rm will want to oer a grandfather clause and

will instead only invest to the level of

ν GF C .

That is, depending on the functions c and F,

the ability to oer a grandfather clause will either reduce investment or have no eect.

4.3 Extensions
This paper is a very preliminary exploration of a hitherto unstudied phenomenon. A proper
treatment of this question would need to do away with the exogenous consumer search
behavior that I imposed in this model. If consumers' taste shocks were correlated period
to period and search were costly, this model could use the tools developed by the rational inattention literature (Sims, 2003). Remember that consumers are perfectly informed
of prices and average quality, but remain uncertain about their own, specic tastes. Consumers would optimally search infrequently, but would take into account changes to price
and non-idiosyncratic quality. Then the measure of consumers who search would be a
function that depended on the size of the change in average quality as well as the size of
the price dierential between competitors. The basic forces of the model, which encourage
a dominant rm to oer a grandfather clause in order to discourage its consumers from
searching, would still have traction without the draconian assumptions imposed in this pa-
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per.
An alternative, and less ambitious, reform to this paper would be to assume that there
was some exogenous, but continuous and increasing, function

α(p21 − p11 )

which deter-

mined the measure of consumers that searched as a function of the increase and prices.
It is likely that in such a model a grandfather clause would not generally be optimal. Instead, rm 1 would probably like to name a cheaper price for its loyal customers than new
customers, but still higher than the initial price. In this case, the behavior would less resemble a grandfather clause and more a rewards program, like those oered by airlines and
credit cards. The strength of this eect would depend on the exact shape of the function

α.
Last, by adding an element of research and development to the model and allowing both
rms to innovate, I could examine what eects the potential for grandfather clauses has
on a rms desire to innovate. They may make rms want to innovate more by yielding
a higher potential reward. However, given the rival's ability to do the same, it's possible
that grandfather clauses would lead to a prisoners' dilemma situation and actually reduce
rm prots from innovation.

4.4 Conclusions
In this paper, I have given a recent, high prole example of a rm instituting a grandfather clause. I have shown the theoretical diculties in explaining this behavior using obvious, existing models. To rectify this gap in our understanding, I propose a model in which
grandfather clauses can be used to manipulate consumer search behavior to the benet
of a rm o the detriment of its competitors. Using a simple example, I explore the consequences of this behavior and nd several interesting outcomes.
I nd that even in an environment explicitly designed to promote them, grandfather clauses
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are not universally protable. This may help explain why, while unquestionably present in
market behavior, grandfather clauses seem rare. I nd that grandfather clauses are most
likely to be oered when the increase in quality that drives a spike in demand is modest. I
also nd that, while grandfather clauses are unambiguously harmful to total welfare, they
have an ambiguous eect on consumer welfare. They help consumers when the increase
in quality is relatively large, although there exists a range of parameters in which a rm
would want to oer a grandfather clause and consumers would benet on net from such an
oer.
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Appendices
A

Proofs for Chapter 1

We rst dene some useful notation. As with shoppers, for non-shoppers who have searched
both rms, we assume that

θN ∈ [0, 1]

will ignore price-matching guarantees and always

purchase from the rm with the lower listed price. The remaining

1 − θN

will invoke a

price-matching guarantee at the last rm they stopped in when one is available and necessary to obtain the lower price there and purchase from the rm with the lower listed price
otherwise. Let



αS(N ) ∈ 0, θS(N )

be the proportion of shoppers (non-shoppers) who buy
1

from the rst rm they searched after having observed the same price listed in both rms.
Let

rj

γ

be the proportion of non-shoppers who do not search after freely observing a price of

at rm

i.

Denition 1. We say that rms have a mutual mass point when each rm has a mass
point at the same price. We say that rms have a mutual break when each rm's equilibrium support has a break over the same price interval.

Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition follows directly from the proof of Claims 1A and 1B below and from Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule, which implies that non-shoppers' reservation prices associated with each rm must be the same when consumers are indierent regarding which
rm's price to sample rst. In particular, Pandora's Rule rules out support types 3 and
4 in Claims 1A and 1B. The proofs of Claims 1A and 1B follows in the same vein as the
proofs of Propositions 2 through 5 in Narasimhan (1988). However, various complications

1 The restriction

αS(N ) ≤ θS(N )

is used for mathematical tractability. It says that when a rm under-

cuts a tie, it cannot lose customers.
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arise because consumers in our model follow an optimal search rule and rms have the
ability to price-match. Therefore, in order to aid the reader, we rst outline the intuition
behind each of the ve steps used to prove Claims 1A and 1B.

Step 1. 1. v ≥ min {p̄1 , p̄2 } ≥ p1 = p2 = p ≥ 0.
Proof intuition.

A rm,

i,

that prices below its rival's lowest price,

number of consumers everywhere on

[pi , pj ),

pj ,

captures the same

such that its prot is increasing in price over

this interval, a contradiction. Prices below zero result in negative prots. A rm
prices above

v

i

that

can only prot from consumers who accept an oer to match a price no

higher than

v

from rm

mass above

v

down to

j.

v,

Firm

i

cannot lose money from such consumers by shifting

but now expects to make sales if rm

j

prices above

v.

Step 1. 2. There are no mutual mass points.
Proof intuition.

This claim follows via a standard mass point undercutting argument (in

this case, borrowed from a draft version of Janssen and Non 2008).

Step 1. 3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p̄i < p̄j , there is a break at (p̄i , p̄j ).
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p̄i = p̄j , there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and rm i has a mass point at rj , there may be a mutual break with lower
bound rj .
Proof intuition.

Because a rm's price distribution function is constant over a break, in

general, it's rival's prot will be higher at one end of the break than the other, or otherwise be increasing in price along the break, which cannot be the case in a mixed strategy equilibrium. The potential exceptions to this argument are items (i) to (iii) listed
above.
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Step 1. 4. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior of rm j 's
equilibrium support, except possibly at rj .
Proof intuition.

The proof of this step follows in a similar fashion to that of Step 1.2, but

relies on the convexity of rm supports away from

rj

such that continuous mass above a

rival mass point can be shifted below it for a gain in prot.

Step 1. 5. If p̄ = p̄1 = p̄2 then either
(i) p̄ = min {v, r1 , r2 }, the supports have no breaks, and at most one rm can have a
mass point at p̄, or
(ii) p̄ = min {v, max {r1 , r2 }}, there is a mutual break above min {r1 , r2 } < p̄, rm i has
a mass point at rj , and rm j has a mass point at p̄.
Proof intuition.

Using Steps 1.1 to 1.4, this step rules out item (ii) in Step 1.3 and places

restrictions on item (iii). Additionally, when rms have the same convex support, this
claim entails that

p̄ = min{v, r1 , r2 }.

At

price-matching guarantees to attain rm

p̄,

rm

j 's

i

only sells to those shoppers who invoke

price. When

p̄ < min{v, r1 , r2 },

rm

i

can

increase prot by raising prices paid by captive non-shoppers without decreasing shopper
prot. When

p̄ > min{v, r1 , r2 },

rm

i

can do better by lowering

p̄

to the point that it sells

to non-shoppers.

Step 1.5 allows us to narrow down the possible supports to item (i) in Step 1.3 and the
two items in Step 1.5. By supposing that all consumers are indierent regarding which
rm to sample rst, we can rely on Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule to further narrow
the supports to item (i) in Step 1.5. Finally, if rm

i

prices with a mass point at

equilibrium, but some non-shoppers searched upon observing
centive to shift the mass point slightly below

rj ,

complete proof.
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rj ,

rm

i

rj

in

would have an in-

a contradiction. We next proceed to the

Claim 1A. Suppose that rms are exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees
and that θS ∈ (0, 1]. In equilibrium, rms play mixed pricing strategies with p1 = p2 = p <
min{p̄1 , p̄2 }. The supports of the rm pricing distributions can only take one of the four

following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p̄1 = p̄2 = p̄ = min {v, r1 = r2 }.
2. Single mass point, no breaks: rm i has a mass point at p̄1 = p̄2 = p̄ = min {v, rj },
rj ≤ ri .

3. Two mass points, mutual break: rm j has a mass point at ri < min {v, rj }; mutual
break over (ri , pu ) for pu ∈ (ri , p̄); p̄1 = p̄2 = p̄ = min {v, rj }, rm i has a mass
point at p̄.
4. Two mass points, single break: rm j has a mass point at p̄j = ri < min {v, rj }; rm
i has a break over (ri , p̄i ) for p̄i = min {v, rj } and a mass point at p̄i .
The following steps complete the proof of Claim 1A.

Step 1A.1. v ≥ min {p̄1 , p̄2 } ≥ p1 = p2 = p ≥ 0.
Proof.

Suppose

p1 < p2 ≤ v .

Then, for

h

p1 ∈ p1 , p2



, rm 1's expected prot is

p1 {µ [θS + (1 − βS ) (1 − θS )]

(19)

+ (1 − µ) {βN + (1 − βN ) {[1 − F2 (r1 )] + (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )}}}
(because

p2 < r 2

p1 ≤ v < p2 ,

for

is increasing in

by denition), which is increasing in

h

p1 ∈ p 1 , v ,

p1 ,

p1 ,

rm 1's expected prot is given by Expression (19), which

so it must be the case that

p1 = v .

But if

(because rm 1 does not make any prot at prices above

µβS (1 − θS ) v

contradicting the equilibrium. If

v)

v = p1 < p2 ,

v−ε

for expected prot of

F1 (v) = 1

and rm 2 expects prot of

everywhere on its support. For suciently small

shifting its mass to

then

ε > 0,

rm 2 benets by

(v − ε) {µ [θS + βS (1 − θS )] + (1 − µ) (1 − βS )}.
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Finally, if

v < p1 ≤ p2 ,
v,

shifting mass to

so

then both rms make zero prots and either can increase prot by

p2 ≤ p1 .

By a similar argument,

Because prices below zero result in negative prot,
Suppose

v < min {p̄1 , p̄2 }.

Pr (pj > v) > 0

Then, for

pi > v ,

p2 ≤ p1

p ≥ 0.

rm

i

and

v ≥ p 1 = p2 = p.

2

expects no prot with probability

and because consumers never purchase at prices above

v,

rm

i

will only

prot from consumers who accept its price-match oer after they had rejected a price no
higher than

v

at rm

ing mass above

v

j.

Thus, rm

down to

prot with probability

v.

i

cannot lose money from such consumers by shift-

However, by doing so, it now also expects to earn a positive

Pr (pj > v),

a contradiction.

Step 1A.2. There are no mutual mass points.
Proof.

Suppose that there is a mutual mass point at

rm 2 charges

p

p.

Firm 1's expected prot at

p

when

as well is

p {µ [βS αS + (1 − βS ) (1 − αS )]
(20)

+ (1 − µ) {βN [Ip<r2 + [γ + αN (1 − γ)] Ip=r2 + αN Ip>r2 ]
+ (1 − βN ) (1 − αN ) [(1 − γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}}
where

I

is an indicator function. Suppose instead that rm 1 deviates to

maintains its price at

p.

p−ε

while rm 2

Firm 1's expected prot will be

(p − ε) {µ [βS θS + (1 − βS )]
(21)

+ (1 − µ) {βN [Ip−ε<r2 + [γ + θN (1 − γ)] Ip−ε=r2 + θN Ip−ε>r2 ]
+ (1 − βN ) [(1 − γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}}
Expression (20) is smaller than Expression (21) provided that
Suppose rm 2 chooses a price other than

p.

ε

Lowering the price charged never reduces the

number of sales so the loss to rm 1 from lowering the price by
when

2 If

p

is suciently small.

ε

is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by

p = 0,

then there must be zero density at

p=0

money o its non-shoppers.
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because at

is at most

ε

ε.

However,

will with positive prob-

pi = ε < min {rj , v},

rm

i

will make

ability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst lead to a loss of
Therefore, by shifting its mass point at

p

to

p−ε

expected prot, a contradiction. For the case

for suciently small

αS = θS , αN = θN ,

and

ε

ε.

rm 1 increases its

βN = βS = 1,

rm 1

cannot protably undercut the mutual mass point, but rm 2 can.

Step 1A.3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p̄i < p̄j , there is a break at (p̄i , p̄j ) ∈ Sj .
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p̄i = p̄j , there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and rm i has a mass point at rj , there may be a mutual break with lower
bound rj .
Proof.

S1 and S2 be respectively,

H = pd , pu ∈ int(S1 ∩ S2 ).
Let

the equilibrium supports for rms 1 and 2. Dene

Suppose rst, without loss of generality, that in equilibrium, rm 2 has no support over
but that rm 1 does. Firm 1's expected prot at some

p1 ∈ H

H,

is

µ {p1 (θS βS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}
+ (1 − µ) {p1 βN {Ip1 <r2 + {γ + θN (1 − γ) [1 − F2 (p1 )]} Ip1 =r2
+ θN [1 − F2 (p1 )] Ip1 >r2 }

(22)

+ (1 − βN ) {p1 [1 − F2 (r1 ) + (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )] Ip1 <r1 + p1 [1 − F2 (r1 )] Ip1 =r1
+ {p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )] + r1 (1 − θN ) (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )
+ (1 − θN ) E [p2 |r1 < p2 < p1 ] [F2 (p1 ) − F2 (r1 )]} Ip1 >r1 }}
As rm 1 raises
along

H

p1

along

(and equal to

H,

its expected prot is increasing because

F2 (r1 )

r1 ∈ H ).

if

prots by shifting all its mass in
point there), a contradiction. If
all mass in

pd , r2



H

slightly below

r2 ∈ H ,

slightly below

Thus, if

r2 ,

r2 ∈
/ H,
pu

(to

pu

F2 (p1 )

is constant

rm 1 could increase expected
if rm 2 does not have a mass

rm 1 can increase expected prots by shifting

and all mass in
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(r2 , pu )

either slightly below

r2

or

to

pu ,

again contradicting the equilibrium. A similar argument applies when rm 1 has no

support over

H,

but rm 2 does. This tells us that any breaks in

Now suppose that neither rm randomizes over

r1 , pd 6= r2

pu

(or slightly below

pu

strictly higher expected prot at

i

i

pd = rj 6= ri

and rm

pu

ri ∈ H )

than at

i

r1

if

pu
i

But if rm

prots are the same at

pd

and

pu

if rm

However, if

case if,

γ = 1,

r1 ∈ H )

if

rj

or rm 2 has a

than at

pd ,

or possibly

pu

(or slightly below

pu

if rm

j

rj ∈ H ).
pd ,

rm

j 's

expected prot will be strictly

has a mass point there, or slightly below

for each rm. If

pd .

pd ,

Because there are no mutual mass points,

does have a mass point at

shifting its mass point slightly below
search after observing a price of

i

than at

contradicting the equilibrium.

has no mass point at

(or slightly below

pd .

rj

pd 6=

Then either rm 1 has a strictly

r2 ∈ H )

could increase prots by shifting its mass point to

higher at

j.

pu ,

pd 6= rj .

has a mass point at

has a mass point there, or slightly below
If

if

pd .

(or slightly below

both, if neither rm has a mass point at
Suppose that rm

r2

are mutual.

in equilibrium. Suppose rst that

and that neither rm has a mass point at

higher expected prot at

rm

H

S1 ∩ S2

γ 6= 1,

pd ,

rm

i

In doing so, it retains

ri

if

then it is possible that
can protably deviate by

1−γ

non-shoppers who

and have a positive probability of purchasing from rm

neither rm may have a protable deviation. This may also be the

pd = r1 = r2 .

From Step 1A.1, we know that both

(min {p̄1 , p̄2 } , max {p̄1 , p̄2 }].
(p̄2 , p̄1 ],

S1

and

S2

have the same lower bound,

Suppose, without loss of generality, that

p,

so

p̄1 > p̄2 .

S1 ∆S2 ∈
At

p1 ∈

rm 1's expected prot is

µ (1−θS ) (1−βS ) E [p2 ] + (1−µ) {p1 βN (Ip1 <r2 + γIp1 =r2 ) Ip1 ≤v

(23)

+ (1−θN ) (1−βN ) {E [p2 |r1 < p2 ] [1 − F2 (r1 )] + r1 (1−γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )}}
If

p̄2 < r2 ,

then for

βN 6= 0,

rm 1's expected prot is increasing in

and is strictly greater anywhere in
As a result, for

ε > 0

(p̄2 ,

min {v,

r2 })

p1

along

(p̄2 ,

min {v,

than at any price above min {v,

r2 }.

suciently small, rm 1 can increase prot by shifting mass in
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r2 })

(p̄2 , p̄1 ]
ther

to min {v,

r2 } − ε

(likewise if

S1 ∆S2 = {p̄1 }= {min {v, r2 }},
p̄2 ,

no mass point at

or

min {v,

p̄2 =

S1 ∆S2 = ∅.

r2 }).

Therefore, when

Suppose

S1 ∆S2 = {p̄1 }.

this means that rm 1's expected prot at

its expected prot at

p̄2 ,

p̄2 ≤ r2 ,

p̄1

ei-

If rm 2 has

is strictly higher than

a contradiction. If rm 2 has a mass point at

p̄2 6= r1 ,

Because

there are no mutual mass points, rm 2 can protably shift the mass point to slightly below
at

p̄1

(or slightly below

p̄2 = r1 ,

and

F1 (r1 )

r1

if

r1 ∈ (p̄2 , p̄1 ]).

However, if

γ = 1,

rm 2 has a mass point

is large enough, then neither rm may have a protable deviation.

r2 < p̄2 < p̄1

Following the proof of Step 1A.5, we will discuss why an equilibrium where
cannot exist. A similar argument applies when

p̄2 > p̄1 .

Corollary 1A.1. The equilibrium supports are the same except if p̄i = rj < p̄j = min {v, ri }.
Step 1A.4. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior of rm
j 's equilibrium support, except possibly at rj .

Proof.

Suppose, without loss of generality, that rm 2 has a mass point at

and suppose that

p 6= r1 .

Firm 1's expected prot at

by Expression (21), whereas its expected prot at

p−ε

p+ε

p ∈ S1 \ {p̄1 },

when rm 2 charges

p

is given

is

µp (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) {(p + ε) βN (Ip+ε<r2 + γIp+ε=r2 )

(24)

+p (1 − θN ) (1 − βN ) [(1 − γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}
Expression (24) is smaller than Expression (21) provided that
pose rm 2 chooses a price other than

p.

ε

Lowering the price charged never reduces the

number of sales so the loss to rm 1 from lowering the price by
However, when

p

is suciently small. Sup-

2ε

or less is at most

is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by

2ε

2ε.

or less will

with positive probability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst
lead to a loss of
ciently small

ε,

2ε.

Therefore, by shifting its mass between

p

and

p+ε

to

p−ε

for suf-

rm 1 increases its expected prot, a contradiction. By a similar argu-

ment, rm 1 cannot have a mass point at

p ∈ S2 \ {p̄2 },
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except possibly if

p = r2 .

Step 1A.5. If p̄ = p̄1 = p̄2 then either
(i) p̄ = min {v, r1 , r2 }, the supports have no breaks, and at most one rm can have a
mass point at p̄, or
(ii) p̄ = min {v, max {r1 , r2 }}, there is a mutual break above min {r1 , r2 } < p̄, rm i has
a mass point at rj , and rm j has a mass point at p̄.
Proof.

Suppose that

p̄ = p̄1 = p̄2

1A.1 and 1A.4 we know that

min {v, r2 }.

At

p̄,

p < p̄ ≤ v .

p̄.

From Steps

p1

along

(p̄,

min {v,

p̄ > min {v, r2 } = r2 .

E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 )). E π1 (p̄)

r2 })

For any

when

βN 6= 0,

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄),

is given by Expression (23) (with

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄), E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 ))

p̄ <

Suppose, without loss of generality, that

rm 1's expected prot is given by Expression (23) (with

which is increasing in
instead that

and neither rm has a mass point at

p1 = p̄),

a contradiction. Suppose

in equilibrium,

p1 = p̄).

If

E π1 (p̄) =

r2 ≥ r1 ,

for

equals

µ {p1 (θS βS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}
(25)

+ (1 − µ) {p1 βN θN [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − βN ) {r1 (1 − θN ) (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )
+ p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θN ) E [p2 |r1 < p2 < p1 ] [F2 (p1 ) − F2 (r1 )]}}
Setting Expression (23) equal to Expression (25) and dierentiating with respect to
yields

[µ (θS βS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) (θN βN + 1 − βN )] [1 − F2 (p1 )]

p1

(26)

0

− [µθS + (1 − µ) θN ] p1 F2 (p1 ) = 0
Solving the dierential equation given by Equation (26) using the initial value
gives us

F2 (p1 ) = 1

for all

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄],

a contradiction. Similarly, if

Expression (25) represents rm 1's expected prot at

(r1 , p̄],
while

a contradiction. If on the other hand,

E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 ))

at

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄)

(r1 , p̄)

r1 ≥ p̄, E π1 (p̄)

and

F2 (p̄) = 1

r1 ∈ (r2 , p̄),

F2 (p1 ) = 1

becomes

for all

then

p1 ∈

µ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 ]

becomes

µ {p1 (θS βS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}
+ (1 − µ) βN θN p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )]
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(27)

Setting

µ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 ]

equal to Expression (27) and solving the resulting dier-

ential equation using the initial value

(r2 , p̄],

a contradiction. Hence, for

βN 6= 1, p̄ = min {v, r1 },

F2 (p̄) = 1

again gives us

βN 6= 0, p̄ = min {v, r2 }.

F2 (p1 ) = 1

or

v < ri ,

Otherwise, rm

j

so when neither rm has a mass point at

p̄, p̄ = min {v, r1 , r2 }.

then following the argument in the paragraph above,
cannot have a mass point at

proof of Step 1A.3). Moreover, if

rj ≥ ri ,

then

p̄

Without loss of generality, let

have a mass point at

r2 .

At

r2 ,

i = 1.

p̄,

say rm

j.

If

p̄ = min {v, ri }.

(using reasoning similar to that in the

p̄ = min {v, r1 , r2 }

know that the rm supports have no breaks. Conversely, suppose

rj < v ).

p1 ∈

By a similar argument, for

From Step 1A.2, we know that at most one rm can have a mass point at

γ = 1

for all

and from Step 1A.3, we

rj < ri

(and therefore,

From Step 1A.4, we know that rm 2 cannot

rm 1 expects prot of

µ {r2 (θS βS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (r2 )] +

(28)

(1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < r2 ] F2 (r2 )} + (1 − µ) βN r2
whereas at

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄), E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 ))

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄), 0 < F2 (r2 ) ≤ F2 (p1 ),

so for

greater than Expression (27). Therefore,

is given by Expression (27). By denition, for

p1

r2

close enough to

r2 ,

Expression (28) is strictly

must be the lower bound for a break in

S1

and

we are in Case (iii) of Step 1A.3).

Notice that Step 1A.5 rules out Case (ii) in Step 1A.3. Moreover, following the same procedure used in Step 1A.5, it is easy to show that an equilibrium where
exist. In particular, by setting

Fj ,

we see that

Fj (pi ) = 1

E πi (p̄i ) = E πi (pi , Fj (pi ))

for all

Claim 1A: Support Type 4.
p̄1 = r2 < min {v, r1 }= p̄2 .

pi ∈ (rj , p̄j ],

for

rj < p̄j < p̄i

pi ∈ (rj , p̄j ]

cannot

and solving for

a contradiction.

Without loss of generality, suppose that

βN

is such that

Then a complete solution to an equilibrium with support type

4, if one exists, requires the following set of equations to hold.
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E π1 p = E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 )) ⇔ p [µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN ]
(29)

= µ {p1 (βS θS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (p1 )]
+ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )} + (1 − µ) βN p1

E π1 p = E π1 (r2 , F2 (r2 )) ⇔ p [µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN ]

(30)

= µ {r2 (βS θS + 1 − βS ) Pr (p2 = p̄2 )
+ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < r2 ] F2 (r2 )} + (1 − µ) βN r2
E π2 p = E π2 (p2 , F1 (p2 ))

(31)

⇔ p {µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )} = (1 − µ) (1 − βN ) p2
+ µ {p2 [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] [1 − F1 (p2 )] + (1 − θS ) βS E [p1 |p1 < p2 ] F1 (p2 )}
E π2 p = E π2 (p̄2 ) ⇔ p {µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )}
= µ (1 − θS ) βS E [p1 ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN ) p̄2
Z r2
F1 (p)dp + r1 − r2 = c

(32)

(33)

p

Z

r2

F2 (p)dp = c

(34)

p

Pr (p1 = r2 ) = 1 − lim F1 (r2 − ε) ∈ (0, 1)

(35)

ε→0−

In addition to Equations (29) to (35), rm 2 must have an expected price which is strictly
lower than that of rm 1. Moreover, the inequality,
must hold for all

ε ∈ (0, p̄2 − r2 ).

E π1 (r2 , F2 (r2 )) > E π1 (p̄2 − ε, F2 (p̄2 − ε))

That is, rm 1 must not wish to deviate above

r2 .

We can use the following procedure to look for equilibrium. First, we use Equation (29)
and (31) to solve for

F2

and

F1

respectively, in terms of

and using Equation (30) to solve for
into Equation (35) yields

Pr (p2 = p̄2 )

p

Pr (p1 = r2 )

we obtain
in terms of

r2

Equation (30) we can rewrite

r1

p

Plugging

in terms of

Pr (p2 = p̄2 ).

and plugging into Equation (33) yields

using Equation (32) to solve for

p.

r1

F2

into Equation (34)

Pr (p2 = p̄2 ).
Rewriting

in terms of

F1

Plugging

F1

in terms of

Pr (p2 = p̄2 ).

Finally,

and setting this equal to the solution obtained from

as an alternate function of
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Pr (p2 = p̄2 ).

Setting the two

expressions for

r1

equal to each other, we can now solve for

Pr (p2 = p̄2 )

ogenous parameters. An equilibrium exists only if there is a solution to
interval

[0, 1]

in terms of the ex-

Pr (p2 = p̄2 )

in the

such that non-shoppers strictly prefer to search rm 2 rst and rm 1 does

not wish to deviate above

r2 .

Claim 1B. Suppose that rm 1 is exogenously required to oer price-matching guarantees
while rm 2 is required not to. In equilibrium, rms play mixed pricing strategies with p1 =
p2 = p < min{p̄1 , p̄2 }. The supports of the rm pricing distributions can only take one of

the four following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p̄1 = p̄2 = p̄ = min {v, r1 = r2 }.
2. Single mass point, no breaks: rm i has a mass point at p̄1 = p̄2 = p̄ = min {v, rj },
rj ≤ ri .

3. Two mass points, mutual break: rm j has a mass point at ri < min {v, rj }; mutual
break over (ri , pu ) for pu ∈ (ri , p̄); p̄1 = p̄2 = p̄ = min {v, rj }, rm i has a mass
point at p̄.
4. Two mass points, single break: rm j has a mass point at p̄j = ri < min {v, rj }; rm
i has a break over (ri , p̄i ) for p̄i = min {v, rj } and a mass point at p̄i .
The following steps complete the proof of Claim 1B.

Step 1B.1. v ≥ min {p̄1 , p̄2 } ≥ p1 = p2 = p ≥ 0.
Proof.

Suppose

p1 < p2 ≤ v .

Then, for

h

p1 ∈ p1 , p2 ,

rm 1's expected prot is

p1 {µ + (1 − µ) {βN + (1 − βN ) {[1 − F2 (r1 )] + (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )}}}
which is increasing in

p1 ,

contradicting the equilibrium. If

p1 ≤ v < p 2 ,

for

rm 1's expected prot is given by Expression (36), which is increasing in
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(36)

h

p1 ∈ p1 , v ,

p1 ,

so it must be

the case that

p1 = v .

But if

ε > 0,

suciently small

v = p1 < p2 ,

rm 2 makes no prot on its support and for

it benets by shifting its mass to

v − ε.

v < p 1 ≤ p2 ,

Finally, if

then both rms make zero prots and either can increase prot by shifting mass to

p2 ≤ p1 .

Suppose

p2 < p1 ≤ v .

Then, for


h
p2 ∈ p2 , p1 ,

v,

so

rm 2's expected prot is

p2 {µ [θS + βS (1 − θS )]

(37)

+ (1 − µ) {(1 − βN ) + βN {[1 − F1 (r2 )] + (1 − γ) Pr (p1 = r2 )}}}
(because

p1 < r1

by denition) which is increasing in

p2 ≤ v < p 1 ,

for

h

p2 ∈ p 2 , v ,

which is increasing in

p2 ,

so it must be the case that

rium. If

F1 (v) = 1
prot of

again contradicting the equilib-

rm 2's expected prot is given by Expression (37),

p2 = v .

But if

µ (1 − βS ) (1 − θS ) v

v ≥ p1 = p2 = p.

The proof that

v = p2 < p1 ,
v)

(because rm 2 does not make any prot at prices above

v−ε

for expected prot of

ε > 0,

rm 1

(v − ε) {µ [θS + (1 − βS ) (1 − θS )] + (1 − µ) βS }.

Because prices below zero result in negative prot,

v ≥ min {p̄1 , p̄2 }

then

and rm 1 expects

everywhere on its support. For suciently small

benets by shifting its mass to
Thus,

p2 ,

p ≥ 0.

3

follows precisely that in Step 1A.1.

Step 1B.2. There are no mutual mass points.
Proof.

Suppose that there is a mutual mass point at

rm 2 charges
to

p−ε

p

p.

Firm 1's expected prot at

p

as well is given by Expression (20). Suppose instead that rm 1 deviates

while rm 2 maintains its price at

p.

Firm 1's expected prot will be

(p − ε) {µ + (1 − µ) {βN + (1 − βN ) [(1 − γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}}
Expression (20) is smaller than Expression (38) provided that
Suppose rm 2 chooses a price other than

p.

ε

3 If

p

is suciently small.

ε

is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by

p = 0,

then there must be zero density at

(38)

Lowering the price charged never reduces the

number of sales so the loss to rm 1 from lowering the price by
when

when

p=0

money o its non-shoppers.
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because at

is at most

ε

ε.

However,

will with positive prob-

pi = ε < min {rj , v},

rm

i

will make

ability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst lead to a loss of
Therefore, by shifting its mass point at

p

to

p−ε

for suciently small

ε

ε.

rm 1 increases its

expected prot, a contradiction.

Step 1B.3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p̄i < p̄j , there is a break at (p̄i , p̄j ) ∈ Sj .
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p̄i = p̄j , there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and rm i has a mass point at rj , there may be a mutual break with lower
bound rj .
Proof.

S1 and S2 be respectively,

H = pd , pu ∈ int(S1 ∩ S2 ).
Let

the equilibrium supports for rms 1 and 2. Dene

H,

Suppose rst that in equilibrium, rm 2 has no support over
Firm 1's expected prot at some

p1 ∈ H

but that rm 1 does.

is

µ {p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}
+ (1 − µ) {p1 βN {Ip1 <r2 + {γ + (1 − γ) [1 − F2 (p1 )]} Ip1 =r2 + [1 − F2 (p1 )] Ip1 >r2 }
(39)

+ (1 − βN ) {p1 [1 − F2 (r1 ) + (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )] Ip1 <r1 + p1 [1 − F2 (r1 )] Ip1 =r1
+ {p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )] + r1 (1 − θN ) (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )
+ (1 − θN ) E [p2 |r1 < p2 < p1 ] [F2 (p1 ) − F2 (r1 )]} Ip1 >r1 }}
As rm 1 raises
along

H

p1

along

(and equal to

H,

its expected prot is increasing because

F2 (r1 )

r1 ∈ H ).

if

prots by shifting all its mass in
point there), a contradiction. If
all mass in

pu ,

pd , r2



H

slightly below

r2 ∈ H ,

slightly below

Thus, if

r2 ,

r2 ∈
/ H,
pu

(to

pu

F2 (p1 )

is constant

rm 1 could increase expected
if rm 2 does not have a mass

rm 1 can increase expected prots by shifting

and all mass in

r2 , pd



either slightly below

r2

or to

again contradicting the equilibrium.

Conversely, suppose that rm 1 has no support over
pected prot at some

p2 ∈ H

is
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H,

but that rm 2 does. Firm 2's ex-

µp2 [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] [1 − F1 (p2 )] + (1 − µ) p2
× {(1 − βN ) {Ip2 <r1 + {γ + θN (1 − γ) [1 − F1 (p2 )]} Ip2 =r1
(40)

+ θN [1 − F1 (p2 )] Ip2 >r1 }
+ βN {[1 − F1 (r2 ) + (1 − γ) Pr (p1 = r2 )] Ip2 <r2
+ [1 − F1 (r2 )] Ip2 =r2 + [1 − F1 (p2 )] Ip2 >r2 }}
As rm 2 raises
along

H

p2

along

(and equal to

H,

its expected prot is increasing because

F1 (r2 )

r2 ∈ H ).

if

prots by shifting all its mass in
point there), a contradiction. If
mass in

pd , r1



slightly below

H

slightly below

r1 ∈ H ,

r1 ,

Thus, if

r1 ∈
/ H,
pu

(to

pu

F1 (p2 )

is constant

rm 2 could increase expected
if rm 2 does not have a mass

rm 2 can increase expected prots by shifting all

and all mass in

(r1 , pu )

again contradicting the equilibrium. Thus, any breaks in

either slightly below

S1 ∩ S2

r1

or to

pu ,

are mutual.

The remainder of this proof follows similarly to that in Step 1A.3.

Corollary 1B.1. The equilibrium supports are the same except if p̄i = rj < p̄j = min {v, ri }.
Step 1B.4. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior of rm
j 's equilibrium support, except possibly at rj .

Proof.

The proof to show that rm 2 does not have a mass point at

p ∈ S1 \ {p̄1 }

pro-

ceeds precisely as that in Step 1A.4. Suppose instead that rm 1 has a mass point at

S2 \ {p̄2 }

and that

p 6= r2 .

Firm 2's expected prot at

p−ε

when rm 1 charges

p

p∈

is

(p − ε) {µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ)
× {(1 − βN ) [Ip−ε<r1 + [γ + θN (1 − γ)] Ip−ε=r1 + θN Ip−ε>r1 ]

(41)

+ βN [(1 − γ) Ip=r2 + Ip>r2 ]}}
whereas its expected prot at

p+ε

is

(1 − µ) (p + ε) (1 − βN ) (Ip+ε<r1 + γIp+ε=r1 )
Expression (42) is smaller than Expression (41) provided that
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ε

(42)

is suciently small. Sup-

pose rm 1 chooses a price other than

p.

Lowering the price charged never reduces the

number of sales so the loss to rm 2 from lowering the price by
However, when

p

2ε

or less is at most

is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by

2ε

2ε.

or less will

with positive probability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst
lead to a loss of
ciently small

ε,

2ε.

Therefore, by shifting its mass between

p

and

p+ε

to

p−ε

for su-

rm 2 increases its expected prot, a contradiction.

Step 1B.5. If p̄ = p̄1 = p̄2 then either
(i) p̄ = min {v, r1 , r2 }, the supports have no breaks, and at most one rm can have a
mass point at p̄, or
(ii) p̄ = min {v, max {r1 , r2 }}, there is a mutual break above min {r1 , r2 } < p̄, rm i has
a mass point at rj , and rm j has a mass point at p̄.
Proof.

Suppose that

p̄ = p̄1 = p̄2

and 1B.4 we know that

and neither rm has a mass point at

p < p̄ ≤ v .

Suppose that

p̄ < min {v, r2 }.

At

p̄.

From Steps 1B.1

p1 ∈ [p̄,

min {v,

r2 }),

rm 1's expected prot is

µ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 ]
(43)

+ (1 − µ) {βN p1 + (1 − θN ) (1 − βN ) {E [p2 |r1 < p2 ] [1 − F2 (r1 )]
+ r1 (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )}}
which is increasing in

r2 .

For any

p1

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄),

when

βN 6= 0,

a contradiction. Suppose instead that

in equilibrium,

E π1 (p̄)= E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 )). E π1 (p̄)

p̄ > min {v, r2 }=

equals

µ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 ]
+ (1 − µ) (1 − θN ) (1 − βN ) {E [p2 |r1 < p2 ] [1 − F2 (r1 )]
+ r1 (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )}
If

r2 ≥ r1 ,

for

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄), E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 ))

equals
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(44)

µ {p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}
(45)

+ (1 − µ) {p1 βN [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − βN ) {r1 (1 − θN ) (1 − γ) Pr (p2 = r1 )
+ p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θN ) E [p2 |r1 < p2 < p1 ] [F2 (p1 ) − F2 (r1 )]}}
Setting Expression (44) equal to Expression (45) and dierentiating with respect to

p1

yields

1 − F2 (p1 ) − [µ (θS + βS − θS βS ) + (1 − µ) (θN + βN − θN βN )] p1 F2 0 (p1 ) = 0
Solving the dierential equation given by Equation (46) using the initial value
gives us

F2 (p1 ) = 1

for all

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄],

a contradiction. Similarly, if

Expression (45) represents rm 1's expected prot at

(r1 , p̄],
while

a contradiction. If on the other hand,

E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 ))

at

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄)

(r1 , p̄)

r1 ≥ p̄, E π1 (p̄)

and

F2 (p̄) = 1

r1 ∈ (r2 , p̄),

F2 (p1 ) = 1

becomes

(46)

for all

then

p1 ∈

µ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 ]

becomes

µ {p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}

(47)

+ (1 − µ) βN p1 [1 − F2 (p1 )]
Setting

µ (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 ]

equal to Expression (47) and solving the resulting dif-

ferential equation using the initial value

F2 (p̄) = 1

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄],

a contradiction. Hence, for

βN 6= 0, p̄ = min {v, r2 }.

min {v, r1 }.

At

is increasing in
But then, at

p̄,

p2 ∈[p̄,

p2

when

min {v,

r1 }),

βN 6= 1,

again gives us

rm 2's expected prot is

(1 − µ) (1 − βN ) p2 ,

or

v < ri ,

Otherwise, rm

j

p̄ = min {v, r1 },

which

so when

p̄, p̄ = min {v, r1 , r2 }.

then following the argument in the paragraph above,
cannot have a mass point at

proof of Step 1B.3). Moreover, if

p̄ <

p̄ > min {v, r1 }.

From Step 1B.2, we know that at most one rm can have a mass point at

γ = 1

for all

Now suppose that

a contradiction. Suppose instead, that

rm 2 expects no prot, a contradiction. Thus,

neither rm has a mass point at

F2 (p1 ) = 1

rj ≥ ri ,

then

p̄

say rm

j.

If

p̄ = min {v, ri }.

(using reasoning similar to that in the

p̄ = min {v, r1 , r2 }

know that the rm supports have no breaks. Conversely, suppose
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p̄,

and from Step 1B.3, we

rj < ri

(and therefore,

rj < v ).
r2 .

At

First, let

r2 ,

i = 1.

From Step 1B.4, we know that rm 2 cannot have a mass point at

rm 1 expects prot of

µ {r2 [1 − F2 (r2 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < r2 ] F2 (r2 )} + (1 − µ) βN r2
whereas at

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄), E π1 (p1 , F2 (p1 ))

p1 ∈ (r2 , p̄), 0 < F2 (r2 ) ≤ F2 (p1 ),

so for

greater than Expression (47). Therefore,

cannot have a mass point at

r1 .

At

r1 ,

is given by Expression (47). By denition, for

p1

r2

we are in Case (iii) of Step 1B.3. Now let

close enough to

r2 ,

Expression (48) is strictly

must be the lower bound for a break in

j = 1.

(49)

is given by

p2 {µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN ) θN } [1 − F1 (p2 )]
p2 ∈ (r1 , p̄), 0 < F1 (r1 ) ≤ F1 (p2 ),

so for

p2

sion (49) is strictly greater than Expression (50). Therefore,
for a break in

S2

and

rm 2 expects prot of

p2 ∈ (r1 , p̄), E π2 (p2 , F1 (p2 ))

By denition, for

S1

From Step 1B.4, we know that rm 1

r1 {µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] [1 − F1 (r1 )] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )}
whereas at

(48)

close enough to

r1

(50)

r1 ,

Expres-

must be the lower bound

and we are again in Case (iii) of Step 1B.3.

Notice that Step 1B.5 rules out Case (ii) in Step 1B.3.

Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.

In equilibrium, a rm must be indierent between any price in its support. There-

fore, for any

pi

in the support of


Fj , E πi p = E πi (pi , Fj (pi )).

Then for rm 1, the prot

equality condition is given by

µ {p1 (βS θS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (p1 )] + (1 − θS ) (1 − βS ) E [p2 |p2 < p1 ] F2 (p1 )}
+ (1 − µ) βN p1 = p [µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN ]
Dierentiating Equation (51) with respect to

p1
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and rearranging gives

(51)

µ {(βS θS + 1 − βS ) F2 (p1 ) + θS p1 F2 0 (p1 ) − βS θS − 1 + βS } − (1 − µ) βN = 0
Solving the dierential equation given by Equation (52) using the initial value

(52)


F2 p = 0

gives



(1 − µ) βN
F2 (p) = 1 +
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS )
We can similarly solve for

F1 (p)

"
  βS θSθ+1−βS #
p
S
1−
p

(53)

to get





  (1−βSθ)θS +βS
p
S
(1 − µ) (1 − βN )

1 −
F1 (p) = 1 +
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ]
p
Without loss of generality, suppose that rm 1 is the one with the mass point at

F2 (p̄) = 1

to solve for

p

in terms of

p̄

(54)

p̄.

Setting

gives



(1 − µ) βN
p = p̄
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN

θS
S θS +1−βS

β

(55)

Substituting Equation (55) into Equation (53) gives



(1 − µ) βN
F2 (p) = 1 +
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS )
"
  βS θSθ+1−βS #
S
(1 − µ) βN
p̄
× 1−
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN p
When

r2 ≤ v , p̄ = r2 .

(56)

Optimal search requires that Equation (2.1) holds. Substituting

Equation (56) into Equation (2.1) yields


1+
Z
×
p

(1 − µ) βN
µ"(βS θS + 1 − βS )

r2



(1 − µ) βN
1−
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN

Integrating to solve for

r2

in terms of

µ, θS , c, βS

and



r2
p

βN ,

 βS θSθ+1−βS #
S

(57)

dp = c

we get

θS

(

[(1 − µ) βN ] βS θS +1−βS
r2 (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) = c 1 −
µ (1 − βS ) (1 − θS )

 )−1 .
(1−βS )(1−θS )
(1−βS )(1−θS )
× [µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN ] 1−βS (1−θS ) − [(1 − µ) βN ] 1−βS (1−θS )

(58)

By assumption, non-shoppers are indierent between which rm to sample rst. Weitz-
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man's (1979) Pandora's Rule implies

Z

r2

r2

Z
F2 (p)dp =

F1 (p)dp


Z r2
Z x
⇔
pdF2 (p) = lim
pdF1 (p) + p̄ 1 − lim F1 (x)

(59)

p

p

x→r2 −

p

x→r2 −

p

The rst equation follows from Pandora's Rule and non-shoppers' indierence (so

r1 = r);

r2 =

the second, which sets the expected price of the two rms equal to each other,

follows from integration by parts together with the fact that

p̄ =min {v, r}

in equilib-

rium. By setting the expected price of rm 1 equal to that of rm 2, we can solve for
in terms of

βS

βN

and the other parameters. To obtain an expression for the expected price of

each rm we proceed as in Janssen, Moraga-Gonzàlez, and Wildenbeest (2005). For rm 2,
we solve for

p

using Equation (56) to get



(1 − µ) βN
p = p̄
(1 − µ) βN + µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) [1 − F2 (p)]
Using a change of variables with

p

u = F2 (p),

we can write

β

θS
S θS +1−βS

(60)

E2 [p] =

R1
0

pdu.

Substituting in

from Equation (60) gives

Z
E2 [p] = p̄
0

1



(1 − µ) βN
(1 − µ) βN + µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) (1 − u)

θS
S θS +1−βS

β

du

(61)

Integrating and rearranging yields
θS

p̄[(1 − µ) βN ] βS θS +1−βS
E2 [p] =
µ (1 − βS ) (1 − θS )


(1−βS )(1−θS )
(1−βS )(1−θS )
1−βS (1−θS )
1−βS (1−θS )
× [µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN ]
−[(1 − µ) βN ]
Proceeding similarly for rm 1, we get
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(62)



p̄ 1 − lim F1 (x)

rclE1 [p] =

x→p̄−

θS

p̄{µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )} (1−βS )θS +βS
+
µβS (1 − θS )
θ


×

(1 − µ) βN
µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN

S
 βS θS +1−β
S

(63)

(

βS (1−θS )

× {µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )} (1−βS )θS +βS



 βS (1−θS ) )
(1−βS )θS +βS
− µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] 1 − lim F1 (x) + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )
x→p̄−

where




(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
lim F1 (x) = 1 +
x→p̄−
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ]


S )θS +βS

 (1−β

βS θS +1−βS 
(1 − µ) βN
× 1−


µ (βS θS + 1 − βS ) + (1 − µ) βN

We can now implicitly solve for

βN

(64)

as a function of the remaining parameters using

E1 [p] =

E2 [p].
Dene

r1∗

and

r2∗

as the equilibrium reservation prices. If

r2 (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) ≤ v , r2∗

dened by Equation (58). Because rms are not concerned with prices above

v,

we dene

r2∗

as positive innity. According to Equation (59), we can set

v,

if

is

r2 (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) >

r1∗ = r2∗ .

Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.

We proceed to prove Part (2) of the proposition rst:

2. Plugging

βS = βN = 1/2

into Equation (61) gives

E [p] = r∗

Z
0

where

r∗ = p̄

1



1−µ
1 − µ + µ (1 + θS ) (1 − u)

by assumption. To see that
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r∗

2θS
 1+θ

is increasing in

S

c,

du

(65)

observe that the inte-

grand in Equation (65) is less than 1 for all values of of

θS ∈ (0, 1].
and

u ∈ [0, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1),

Because the limits of integration are 0 and 1, this implies that

r∗ > 0.

Thus, the derivative of

r∗

c

with respect to

and

E [p] < r∗

is clearly positive as well.

The derivatives of the right hand side integrand in Equation (65) with respect to
and

θS

are both negative, implying that

cording to Equation (2.1) (rewritten as

E[p]/r∗

is decreasing in

r∗ − E[p] = c

using

µ

and

θS

µ

and ac-

p̄ = min {v, r∗ }),

so is

r∗ .
1. Dene

F (µ, θS , c; p)

F (µ, θS , v; p)

as the equilibrium distribution function when

p̄ = r∗ < v

p̄ = v < r∗ .

as the equilibrium distribution function when

and

From Equa-

tion (56) and Part (2), we have

1
∂F (µ, θS , c; p)
=
∂µ
1 + θS

(

1
µ2

"

r∗
p

 1+θ
S
2θ
S

#
−1

)
  1−θS
(1 + θS ) (1 − µ) r∗ 2θS ∂r∗
−
> 0,
2µθS p
p
∂µ
"  1+θS
#
1
∂F (µ, θS , v; p)
v 2θS
= 2
− 1 ≥ 0.
∂µ
µ (1 + θS )
p
(
 ∗  1+θ
S 
2θS
∂F (µ, θS , c; p)
1−µ
r
=
−1 +
1+
∂θS
p
µ (1 + θS )2
 )
  ∗
(1 + θS ) θS ∂r∗
r
1 + θS
−
> 0,
ln
p
r∗
∂θS
2θS 2
∂F (µ, θS , v; p)
1−µ
=
∂θS
µ(
(1 + θS )2
)
  1+θ
 

S 
v 2θS
v 1 + θS
×
1 + ln
− 1 ≥ 0.
p
p
2θS 2
The inequalities in Equations (67) and (69) are strict for all
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p ∈ [0, v).

(66)

(67)

(68)

(69)

Proof of Proposition 4
Proof.
At any

We begin by showing that

p1 ∈ p, min {v, r1 , r2 }

βN , βN + (1 − γ) (1 − βN ),
at, or above

r1 ,

where

observing a price of

γ

r1

p ≥ min {v, r1 , r2 }.



, rm 1 captures

at rm 2. Non-shoppers who buy from rm 1 end up paying

Equation (2.1) we know that

and

v ≥ min {p̄1 , p̄2 } ≥ p≥ min {v, r1 , r2 }.

4

to

At any

v,

p1 .

a contradiction.

min {r1 , r2 } > p,

p̄2 > p̄1 .

(p̄1 , p̄2 ]

p1 ,

so

min {p̄1 , p̄2 }= v = p.

p2 ∈ (p̄1 , p̄2 ],

Moreover, from

Suppose, without

rm 2 expects prot of

rm 2 expects an additional prot of

contradiction. Using a similar argument we can rule out

p.

min {p1 , p2 },

shoppers, who pay

is the proportion of non-shoppers who do not search after freely

It is straightforward to show that

shifting its mass in

1−βS

p < min {v, r1 , r2 }.

or all non-shoppers, depending on whether rm 2 prices below,

Thus, rm 1's prot is increasing in

loss of generality, that

Suppose conversely that

p̄1 > p̄2 .

µβS v .

By

(1 − µ) (1 − βN ) v ,

Thus,

a

v= p̄1 = p̄2 = p̄ =

Because the unique equilibrium is symmetric and employs pure strategies, we can dene

F1 (p) = F2 (p) = F (p)
we get

as 0 for

p<v

and as 1 for

p ≥ v.

But then, using Equation (2.1)

r1∗ = r2∗ = v + c.

Proof of Proposition 5
Proof.

This proof follows very similarly to that of Proposition 2. In equilibrium, a rm

must be indierent between any price in its support. Therefore, for any
of


Fj , E πi p = E πi (pi , Fj (pi )).

i = 1, 2,

pi

in the support

Dierentiating this prot equality with respect to

rearranging, and solving the ensuing dierential equation gives us

F1

and

pi

for

F2

in

the statement of the proposition.
A comparison of

0,

F1

and

F2

will reveal that when

βN < 1/2,

such that rm 2 is the one with the mass point at

4 See Claim 1A, Step 1A.1, which holds for all

θS .
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p̄.

it must be that

lim F2 (x) <

x→p̄−

As discussed in the body of the

article, when

βS = 1/2,

Therefore, we may set

consumer indierence regarding the rst sample requires

F1 (p̄) = 1

to solve for

p

in terms of

p̄.

Substituting into

βN < 1/2.

F1

gives


(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
F1 (p) = 1 +
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ]


(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
p̄
1−
(1 − µ) (1 − βN ) + µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] p


When

r1 ≤ v , p̄ = r1 .

Optimal search requires that Equation (2.1) holds. Substituting

Equation (70) into Equation (2.1) and integrating in order to solve for

c, βS

and

βN ,

we get

(70)

r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN )

r1

in terms of

µ, θS ,

in the statement of the proposition.

By assumption, non-shoppers are indierent between which rm to sample rst. As per
the proof of Proposition 2, Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule implies that
and

E1 [p] = E2 [p]

solve for

βN

r1 = r2 = r

in equilibrium. Using the expected price equality, we can now implicitly

as a function of the remaining parameters. Following the same procedure as

in Proposition 2, we obtain the following expressions for rms' expected prices:



p̄ (1 − µ) (1 − βN )
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ]
ln 1 +
E1 [p] =
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ]
(1 − µ) (1 − βN )

(71)

and




E2 [p] = p̄ 1 − lim F2 (x)
x→p̄−


[µ + (1 − µ) βN ]βS +θS −βS θS
(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
+ p̄
µ (1 + βS θS − θS − βS )
( µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )
× [µ + (1 − µ) βN ]1+βS θS −θS −βS

(72)

 

1+βS θS −θS −βS )
− µ 1 − lim F2 (x) + (1 − µ) βN
x→p̄−

where




(1 − µ) βN
lim F2 (x) = 1 +
x→p̄−
µ
(

 β +θ 1−β θ )
S
S
S S
(1 − µ) (1 − βN )
× 1−
µ [(1 − βS ) θS + βS ] + (1 − µ) (1 − βN )
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(73)

Dene

r1∗

and

is dened by

r2∗

r1 (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) ≤ v , r1∗

as the equilibrium reservation prices. If

r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN )

not concerned with prices above

in the statement of the proposition. Because rms are

v,

r1 (µ, θS , c, βS , βN ) > v ,

if

we dene

r1∗

as positive

r1∗ = r2∗ .

innity. According to Equation (59), we can set

Proof of Proposition 6
Proof.

The crux of this proof relies on the fact that for all

A ln (1 + 1/A),
1.

is strictly increasing in

A.

Moreover,

A ∈ (0, ∞),

the function

lim A ln (1 + 1/A) = 0

A→0

and

lim A ln (1 + 1/A) =

A→∞

We again prove Part (2) of the proposition rst.

2. Let

A = [2 (1 − µ) (1 − βN )] / [µ (1 + θS )].

in Proposition 5 yields

Substituting

r (·) = c/ [1 − A ln (1 + 1/A)].

itive and we can see that it is increasing in
decreasing (increasing) in

µ

θS

or

as

F1 (µ, θS , c; p)

F1 (µ, θS , v; p)

and

p̄

Suppose that

p̄ = v < r∗ .

if and only if

∂βN
∂θS

Some straight-

p̄ = r∗ < v

p̄ = v < r∗ .

F1 (p)

and

Addition-

in Proposition 5 and

µ

for all

p, F1 (µ, θS , v; p)

is decreas-

From the proof of Part (2), it follows

if and only if

∂βN
∂µ

1−βN
> − µ(1−µ)

and increasing in

N
> − 1−β
.
1+θS

Suppose instead that

[0, r∗ ), 1 − p̄/p

1 − p̄/p ≤ 0

p ∈ [0, v)).

is increasing in

θS .

is

F1 (p) = 1 + A (1 − p̄/p).

Because

ing in A (and strictly so for all

F1 (µ, θS , v; p)

or

r (·)

completes the proof.

into the expression for

manipulating algebraically gives us

θS

∂A/∂θS

µ

as the equilibrium distribution function when

βS = 1/2

r (µ, θS , c, βS , βN )

Moreover, it can be seen that

as the equilibrium distribution function when

ally, substituting

that

and

into

This expression is clearly pos-

decreases (increases) in

∂A/∂µ

forward algebraic manipulation of

1. Dene

A

A.

βS = 1/2

p̄ = r∗ < v .

strictly falls in

A,

Because

r∗

is increasing in

A,

for any

p ∈

becoming more negative. As in the paragraph
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above, the remainder of the proof is now a direct consequence of the proof of Part
(2).
Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule (see in particular, Equation (59)) then implies the relationships regarding expected prices.

Proof of Proposition 7
Proof.

This proof follows very similarly to that of Proposition 5, but with

βN

set to one or

zero as appropriate.

1. Solving the usual prot equality condition,
yields

for all


E πi p = E πi (pi , Fj (pi ))

for

F1

and

"
  1+θ2 #
p
p
S
1
= F2 (p)
1−
F1 (p) = 1 − <
p
µ
p
p ∈

p, p̄



F2

(74)

. This implies that rm 1 has a higher reservation price and ex-

pected price, contradicting the assumption that non-shoppers prefer to sample it
rst.

2. The solution to the prot equality condition now gives us
part of the statement of the proposition. Comparison of
when

βN = 0,

it must be that

the mass point at

p̄.

Substituting into

F2

lim F2 (x) < 0,

x→p̄−

Therefore, we may set

F1

and

and

F2

F2

in the second

will reveal that

such that rm 2 is the one with

F1 (p̄) = 1

to solve for

p

in terms of

F2 (p) = 1 −

r2 ≤ v , p̄ = r2 .

2(1 − µ)p̄
[2 − µ(1 − θS )]p

 1+θ2

S

µ, θS ,

and

c,

(75)

Optimal search requires that Equation (2.1) holds. Substi-

tuting Equation (75) into Equation (2.1) and integrating in order to solve for
terms of

p̄.

gives



When

F1

we get

r2 (µ, θS , c)
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r2

in

in the statement of the proposition. De-

ne

r2∗

as the equilibrium reservation price. If

r2 (µ, θS , c).
v,

B

we dene

r2 (µ, θS , c) ≤ v , r2∗

Because rms are not concerned with prices above

r2∗

v,

is dened by
if

r2 (µ, θS , c) >

as positive innity.

Proofs for Chapter2

Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma1:

Proof.

π i (p)

is dierentiable at

∀i , pi = p.

I want to show that, if a rm expects all other rms to charge a uniform price, that

rm's prot function is everywhere dierentiable in its own price. First note that

(p1 )V (S1 (p)).

π(p) =

Since the product of two dierentiable functions is dierentiable, then it

suces to show that

V (S1 (p))

is dierentiable in

p1 . S1 (p)

is equal to the intersection of

the sets of consumers that prefer rm 1 to rm j, for each j. Suppose that all other rms
charge a uniform price p. The region

S1 (p)

is given by the set of x satisfying constraints

(76) and (77).

∀i , 0 ≤ xi

(76)

∀j≥1 , 0 ≤ p − p1 + t

Dene

α = p − p1 .

straints bind. Then,

Suppose that

S1 (p)

If

n
X

n
X

k=1

k=1

(zkj − xk )2 − t

p1 > p

and

α < 0.

α < 0,

V (S1 (p)) =

p.

is clearly dierentiable in both alpha and

n
Y
δi t + α

p1 .

(77)

From Lemma 2, only type one con-

is merely a hyperrectangle with side length

i=1

F (α)

(zk1 − xk )2

2t

δi t+α
.
2t

:= F (α)

For the other case, suppose that

p1 <

Every type of constraint will bind in this case. Once more consider the hypercube de-
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ned by the type 1 constraints. Let

δi t + α
∀i
2t

Aj := {x ∈ Rn |xi ≤

and

0≥α+t

X

δj − 2δj xj }

i∈Ij

This is the set of points that constrant j excludes from the region dened by the type 1
constraints. Consider a constraint from rm j of type k,

Aj ,

the measure of

0≤α+t

it will be helpful to dene some notation. Let

constraints are merely of the form
else. Then the measure of

Z

Aj

x̄n

0 ≤ x̄i .

σi =

Pk

j=i+1 (1

i=1 δj

x̄i =

− 2xj )δj

− 2δj xj .

To nd

δi t+α
, so type one
2δi t
if

i < k

and zero

is given by the following integral:

x̄k

Z
...

x̄i

Z
...

1
2

0

Let

Pk

x̄1

Z

δi +σi
2δi

...
α+δ1 t+tσ1
2δ1 t

1 dx1 dx2 . . . dxn

Since neither the constant function being integrated nor any of the bounds of integration
depend on

xk+1

through

xn ,

their only contribution to the integral will be to multiply by a

constant. So the above reduces to

(

n
Y

i=k+1
The region

Aj

x̄k

Z
x̄i )

Z
...

1
2

x̄i

x̄1

Z

δi +σi
2δi

...
α+δ1 t+tσ1
2δ1 t

1 dx1 dx2 . . . dxk

is, geometrically speaking, a hyperpyramidal hyperprism. That is, it is a k

dimensional hyperpyramid that has been prismed into n-k other dimensions. Picturing the
regions

Aj

for a three dimensional cube may make it clearer why this must be the case,

and why such a shape would lead to the above integral. Evaluating the integrals yields a
much simpler expression:

n
(k − 1)k−1 αk Y α + tδi
(
)
Q
2k k!tk ki=1 δi i=k+1 2tδi
It should be noted that

V (Aj ) = V (Ai )

if rms i and j are both type k. This is true be-
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cause the hypercube may be rotated to move rm i into the position of rm j while preserving rm zero at the origin. Lastly, note that there are

n
k



type k rms. Consider the

function

n

2
X

n  
n
X
n (k − 1)k−1 αk Y α + tδi
)
H(α) :=
V (A ) =
(
Qk
k k!tk
2tδ
k
i
2
δ
i
i=1
j=2
k=2
i=k+1

H 0 (α) ≥ 0

by inspection. If

j

α > 0,

S2n −1 j
V (S1 (p)) = F (α) − V ( j=1
A ).

then

were pairwise disjoint, then the above would be equal to

F (p) − H(α).

If all of the

Aj

However, since the

sets are not disjoint, construct the following sets.

E2 := {x ∈ Rn |∃i,j

such that

E3 := {x ∈ Rn |∃i,j,k

x ∈ Ai ∩ Aj }

such that

x ∈ Ai ∩ Aj ∩ Ak }

.
.
.

In general, let

G(α) :=

Ei

P2n −1
k=2

be the set of x such that x is in the intersection of at least i

V (Ek ).

Aj .

Dene

Then:

V (S0 (p)) = F (α) − H(α) + G(α)
G0 (α) ≥ 0,

since each

Aj

also strictly increasing in

H 0 (α) ≥ 0.

Since

H 0 (α)|α=0 = 0.

H(α)

is strictly increasing in

α.

is a polynomial in

Now, note that

∂
H 0 (α) = (2n − 1) ∂α
Aj ,

G0 (α) ≤ H 0 (α).
H(α).

G(α)

α

while

∂
V
∂p1

would grow fastest relative to

Aj .

is

it is obvious that

in

α

if all of the

So even in this most ideal case,

∂
F (α)
∂p1

is bounded between
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H(α)

Suppose, for a moment, that that is the

∂
G(α) = (2n − 2) ∂α
Aj .

(S1 (p))

H(α),

Ei

where each term is of degree at least two,

Finally, the chain rule tells us that

From the above,

it must also the case that each

Looking at the functional form of

new volume were in the intersection of every
case.

α,

= F 0 (α),

and likewise for

∂
F (α) and ∂p∂ 1 (F (α)
∂p1

− H(α)).

Thus the left derivative of the demand function is bounded above and below by
This is also the right hand derivative of
tiable at

p1 = p.

V (S1 (p))

at

p1 = p,

and so

V (S1 (p))

∂
F (α).
∂p1

is dieren-

It is dierentiable everywhere else by inspection.

Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2: If

2n

rms are positioned in a reectively symmetric arrangement on an n-cube,

only type one constraints bind.

Proof.

We may assume that the price charged by the rm we are considering, p, is weakly

larger than that it expects its competitors to charge,

p̂.

This is safe due to the dierentia-

bility of the prot function and the fact that, in equilibrium, they will all charge the same

2tδj xj ≤ δj t − p1 + p
Pk
i=1 δi . It sufi=1 2tδi xi ≤ p − p1 + t

price. I wish to show that it is impossible for a vector to satisfy
for all j, but violate a constraint of the form
ces to show that, for

x2

through

xk

as large as they can be, the latter constraint is still

looser than the type one constraint for
to

x1 ≤

Pk

x1 .

Plugging these in, the type k constraint reduces

δ1 t+(k−2)(p1 −p)
, whereas the type one is given by
2δ1 t

x1 ≤

δ1 t−p1 +p
. Since
2δ1 t

p1 ≥ p

by assumption and in equilibrium, this holds and the type k constraint is, in fact, redundant.

Proof of Theorem 1
If

2n

rms locate in a reectively symmetric positioning on an n-cube and compete in

prices, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which rms charge
and earn prots equal to

Proof.

π∗ =

p∗ =

t hm({δi }n
i=1 )
n

t hm({δi }n
i=1 )
.
2n n

Recall that there are two forms of the prot function for a potential deviant,

for when

p1 < p

and

π2

when

p1 ≥ p.

π1

The dierence stems from the fact that more con-

straints on the set of consumers captured may bind when
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p1 < p ,

so that

D1

is weakly

smaller in this case. Thus

π 1 (p) ≤ π 2 (p)∀p .

so the prot function follows

π 2 (p).

In a candidate symmetric equilibrium,

Then, since

π2

is more optimistic, if rm 1 does not

wish to deviate if it assumes that the prot function always follows
to deviate taking

p1 (

Qn

i=1

π1

p1 = p,

π2,

it will never wish

into account. For the rest of the proof, then, I will focus on

π 2 (p) =

δi t+p−p1
).
2δi t

Any best response to an opposing strategy of

p

must either be on the boundary of the fea-

sible set or satisfy a rst order condition. The boundaries are easily ruled out because setting

p1

p1 = 0

earns zero prot in equilibrium and cannot be optimal, and an extremely large

ensures that

D1 = 0 = π .

Therefore, the best response must satisfy the rst order con-

dition (78).

n
Y
δi t + p − p 1
i=1
It is safe to assume that

Qn

i=1

2δi t

n
X
−1 Y δj t + p − p1
+ p1
=0
2δ
t
2δ
t
i
j
i=1
j6=i

δi + p − p1 6= 0∀i ,

otherwise

π = 0.

(78)

Then, dividing (78) through by

δi t+p−p1
and rearranging, the rst order condition simplies to (79).
2δi t

1

p 1 = Pn

(79)

1
i=1 δi t−p1 +p

Then the unique candidate symmetric equilibrium obeys

p1 = p

and yields

t
p∗ = Pn

1
i=1 δi

To ensure that this candidate equilibrium is actually an equilibrium, note that proposition
3 of Caplin and Nalebu (Caplin and Nalebu, 1991) guarantees that
in

p1 .

As long as

p∗

π

is quasiconcave

represents a local maximum, quasiconcavity guarantees that it is the

global maximum. Brute computation shows that
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n

n

X1 X 1
∂2 2
∗ = −
π
(p)|
−
<0
p=p
2
∂ 2 p1
δ
δ
i
i
i=1
i=1
Since the candidate equilibrium satises the rst order condition at a locally concave point,
it is a local and hence global maximum. It is the unique symmetric equilibrium because no
other symmetric pairing can satisfy the rst order condition for
due to the dierentiability of

π2,

a necessary condition

π.

Proof of Theorem 2
Proof.

Since the basic positioning dominates any reectively symmetric positioning of

2n

rms on an n-cube, it suces to show that the oset positioning dominates the basic positioning. Recall that each rm in the basic positioning on an n-cube earns

π∗ =

t
. Then
2n n

this proof is simply a matter of showing that in any pricing equilibrium of the oset position on an (n+1)-cube rms earn prots greater than

π∗.

First I must nd the prot function of a potential deviant when rms are located in the
oset positioning. Dene

τ =

2t−p1 +p
and consider an (n+1)-cube. In any symmetric
2t

equilibrium, only type 2 constraints bind. The argument for this is similar to the proof
of Lemma 1, and is thus omitted. I must nd the volume of a region bounded by the following constraints

x i ≤ τ − xj

∀i,j

xi ≥ 0 ∀i

To clean up notation a bit, dene

Mi,j,k

as

M ax{xi , xj , xk }.

gion can be given by
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Then, the volume of this re-

τ

Z

τ −xn

Z

Z

τ −Mn−1,n

Z

τ −M1,2,...n

1dx1 dx2 ...dxn+1

...
0

0

(80)

0

0

Due to all of the maxima in the bounds of this integral, it is tiresome to evaluate directly.
Instead, consider the volume of the subregion in which

xn+1 = M1,2,...n+1 .

This volume is

given by (81) which simplies to (82).

τ

Z

Z

M in[xn+1 ,τ −xn+1 ]

M in[xn+1 ,τ −xn+1 ]

Z

M in[xn+1 ,τ −xn+1 ]

Z
...

0

τ

Z

Z

0

0

τ −xn+1

Z

τ −xn+1

...
τ
2

If

xn+1

0

1dx1 dx2 ...dxn+1

(81)

1dx1 dx2 ...dxn+1

(82)

0

Z

τ
2

xn+1

Z

xn+1

...

1dx1 dx2 ...dxn+1 +
0

0

Z

0

0

is the largest coordinate, any other coordinate that satises

satisfy all constraints. However, for

xn+1

xj ≤ τ − xn+1

will

to be the largest coordinates, all others must be

smaller than it, meaning they can be no larger than

M in[xn+1 , τ − xn+1 ].

Then, after split-

ting the integral to get rid of the minima in the bounds, it is trivial to evaluate the integrals and get

τ n+1
τ n+1
τ n+1
+
=
(n + 1)2n+1 (n + 1)2n+1
(n + 1)2n

(83)

The labeling of coordinates is arbitrary, here. The overall region can be partitioned into
n equal pieces, where each coordinate, in turn, is the largest. The total volume, therefore,
must be n times the volume I just found, or
Multiply

D1

by

p1

D1 =

τ n+1
. Expanding
2n

to get

π 0 (p) = p1

(2t − p1 + p)n+1
2n+1 tn+1 2n

Consider the rst order condition (84).
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τ , D1 =

(2t−p1 +p)n+1
.
2n+1 tn+1 2n

(2t − p1 + p)n+1
(2t − p1 + p)n
−
(n
+
1)p
=0
1
2n+1 tn+1 2n
2n+1 tn+1 2n

(84)

With the symmetry condition, (84) easily reduces to (85).

2t = (n + 1)p1

(85)

Then our candidate equilibrium for the oset positioning is

p=

2t
. The proof that this
n+1

is actually equilibrium follows the argument from the proof of Theorem 1 almost exactly.
There can be no symmetric equilibria with

p<

2t
because every rm would have a profn+1

itable deviation to an incrementally higher price. Then each rm will earn at least
in equilibrium which is equal to

π∗

when n=1 and strictly greater for

2t
2n (n+1)

n ≥ 2.

Proof of Theorem 3
Proof.

In order for an allocation (a,b,p) to be an equilibrium, it must be the case either

that it is a local maximum at itself with respect to

π

or that it lies on the boundary of the

feasible set. Otherwise, the deviant would have a local protable deviation.
First, consider the cases in which (a,b,p) is a local maximum at itself with respect to
In order to use calculus, the derivatives of

π(a, b, p, a, b, p)

π.

with respect to the fourth, fth,

and sixth variables must exist at any feasible, interior (a,b,p). At any point (a,b,p,a,b,p),

ρ=φ

, which means that the derivatives of the two halves of the prot function,

π 1 and π 2 ,

must agree at such points. Taking the derivatives and simplifying, we obtain that:
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Figure 1:

Prots from various location strategies

(1 − 2a)(3 − 4a − 4b)p
∂π 2 (a, b, p, a, b, p)
∂π 1 (a, b, p, a, b, p)
=
=
∂â
8(1 − a − b)2
∂â
1
2
∂π (a, b, p, a, b, p)
(1 − 2b)(3 − 4a − 4b)p
∂π (a, b, p, a, b, p)
=
=
2
8(1 − a − b)
∂ b̂
∂ b̂
1
∂π (a, b, p, a, b, p)
1 − a − b − 2p
∂π 2 (a, b, p, a, b, p)
=
=
∂ p̂
4(1 − a − b)
∂ p̂

(86)

(87)

(88)

The derivatives clearly exist, so by taking the above expressions, setting them equal to
zero and solving, I nd that an interior (a,b,p) is a local maximum at itelf with respect
to

π

only if:

(a, b, p) = (a,
Recall that it is assumed that

a ∈ ( 38 , 12 ).

(89)

so I restrict scrutiny on the above expression to

Below is a picture with three graphs. The downward sloping graph is

a, 81 , 12 , .278, .12),
graph is

a ≥ b,

1
3
− a, )
4
8

the upward sloping graph is

π(a, 43 − a, 81 , a, 34 − a, 81 ).

π(a, 43 − a, 18 , .357, .357, .117),

All graphs are over the range

π(a, 34 −

and the at

a ∈ [ 83 , 34 ].

It is clear that at least one of the sloped graphs is above the at graph at every point in
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the continuum dened by (24). This means that at every point, a rm may make higher
prot by deviating to one of (.357,.357,.117) or (.5,.278,.12) rather than staying in equilibrium. Then no point on the continuum is a global maximum at itself with respect to

π

and no such point is an equilibrium. It suces to show that there are no boundary points
with global maxima at themselves with respect to

π.

First, consider the boundary in which p=0. If p=0, then rms cannot make any prot.
Unless all rms are piled on top of each other, a rm may make positive prot by charging
a extremely small but positive amount. If all rms are on top of each other, any rms will
have incentive to move away so that they may make positive prot by charging a positive
price. Therefore, there can be no equilibria with p=0.
Consider the boundary dened by b=0. The interior of this boundary is

p ∈ R+ .

a ∈ (0, 21 )

and

Suppose that rms have their choices restricted to this boundary and dene

π̂(a, p, â, p̂) = π(a, 0, p, â, 0, p̂).
ary, there must be an

(a∗ , p∗ )

For there to be an equilibrium on the interior of this boundthat is a local maximum at itself with respect to

derivatives and setting them equal to zero, it is easy to see that no such

π̂ .

(a∗ , p∗ )

Taking

exists on

the interior of this boundary.
Using a similar technique for the a=
The candidate equilibrium is

1
boundary, we can nd that such a point does exist.
2

( 12 , 41 , 18 ).

Note, however, that this point is on the continuum

scrutinized previously and cannot be an equilibrium.
Our last boundary is characterized by a=b. The local self optimum of this boundary is
given by

( 38 , 38 , 18 ),

which is also on the continuum and not an equilibrium.

We have now ruled out equilibria at all points except those of the form
and

( 12 , 21 , p).

For the reasoning explained earlier, all rms at

( 12 , 21 )

(0, 0, p), ( 21 , 0, p),

cannot be an equi-

librium, as it would be impossible to make a positive prot. Again, by ruling out locally
protable deviations along the boundary, we need only examine the points

( 12 , 0, 14 ).

It is protable to deviate from

(0, 0, 21 )
112

to

9
( 12 , 12 , 20
),

and from

(0, 0, 21 )

( 12 , 0, 14 )

to

and

(.373, .373, .221).
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